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ARTICLES 
Federal Court Reform of State 
Criminal Justice Systems: A 
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine 
From a Modern Perspective 
Donald H. Zeigler* 
The Supreme Court in its 1971 decision of Younger v. Harris prohib-
ited federal court intervention in pending state criminal proceedings in 
the absence of special circumstances. This Article examines the Younger 
doctrine from a modern perspective and argues for its abolition. The Ar-
ticle shows that abstention in cases seeking reform of state criminal justice 
systems is inconsistent with federal court activism in other areas. It ar-
gues that state judges are not entitled to greater deference by federal 
courts than other state officials. It then explains why federal injunctive 
relief is essential to achieve systemic reform of state criminal justice. Fi-
nally, the Article offers specific guidelines for litigants and courts in the 
handling of criminal justice reform cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts generally have refused to use their equitable powers 
to reform state criminal justice systems. This reticence is due in part to 
the Supreme Court's extension of the traditional nonintervention doc-
trine that forbids a federal court from enjoining a pending state crimi-
• Visiting Professor of Law, New York Law School; Professor of Law, Pace Uni-
versity. A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D. 1969, Columbia University. The author 
wishes to thank Donald L. Doernberg and Scott Westervelt for their helpful comments 
on drafts of this article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance 
of Kendra Golden, Sari Jaffe, Patrick Ovington, Debra Poole, Davida Scher, Scott 
Westervelt, and Carole Wilder. 
31 
University of California, Davis
nal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances.' In 1971 the
Court in Younger v. Harris signaled the reemergence of this abstention
doctrine. 2 The Court soon extended Younger to bar cases in which
plaintiffs sought systemic reform of state criminal justice, even though
the plaintiffs did not seek to enjoin any pending state court proceed-
ings.' The lower federal courts followed this lead;4 by the late 1970's,
federal courts effectively abandoned their scrutiny of state administra-
tion of justice under the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. section
1983."
A previous article by this author assessed Younger abstention from
an historical perspective. It contended that the federal courts' refusal to
use their equitable powers to reform state criminal justice systems di-
rectly contravenes the intent of the Reconstruction Congresses that
adopted the fourteenth amendment and section 1983. The present Ar-
ticle assesses the Younger doctrine from a modern perspective. It argues
that the doctrine should be abandoned.7 The principles of equity, feder-
alism, and comity that underlie abstention should be recast as factors to
' This doctrine of self restraint is judicially developed and combines principles of
comity, equity, and federalism. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine
and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State
Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 269-70 (1976). For a review of the histori-
cal development of the doctrine, see id. at 269-82; Wechsler, Federal Courts, State
Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740 (1974); Whitten,
Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The
Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REV. 591 (1975).
2 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, the Court reversed a lower court decision en-
joining plaintiff's prosecution under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act. Id. at 40-
41. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), decided the same day as Younger, refused
to permit federal declaratory relief that has the same practical impact as an injunction.
Id. at 72-73. The Court reasoned that declaring New York's criminal anarchy statute
unconstitutional would halt the plaintiff's prosecution as effectively as an injunction;
thus the court refused to make such a declaration.
3 See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
377-80 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-504 (1974).
4 For a review of such cases, see Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in
Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 1039-41.
5 Id. at 988. See also Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1038-41 (1977).
6 See Zeigler, supra note 4.
7 This Article reflects a substantial evolution in the author's views. In 1976 he advo-
cated "a middle course" that would retain Younger abstention but construe the doctrine
narrowly to allow the federal courts to play a substantial role in vindicating the consti-
tutional rights of criminal defendants. See Zeigler, supra note 1, at 268-69, 283-306.
He now believes that a middle course is inappropriate and that the Younger doctrine
should not be retained.
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consider in the wise exercise of equitable discretion.'
The first three sections of the Article present the case for direct fed-
eral court intervention to work systemic reform of state criminal jus-
tice.9 Section I contends that abstention in criminal justice cases is
wholly inconsistent with federal court activism in school desegregation,
legislative reapportionment, and prisoners' rights suits.10 State criminal
justice exhibits many of the characteristics that made federal court in-
tervention in the other areas both necessary and appropriate. Conse-
quently, federal courts should not abstain in criminal justice reform
cases. Section II examines whether the Younger doctrine can be justi-
fied by special principles of comity between federal and state judges. It
concludes that state courts are not entitled to greater deference than the
other branches of state government in actions alleging systemic violation
of federal constitutional rights. Section III explores the inherent limita-
tions of Supreme Court review of state court judgments and federal
habeas corpus as remedial devices and explains why injunctive relief is
s Other commentators have advocated this approach, although for different reasons
than are advanced here. See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YAL L.J. 71 (1984) (contending that abstention
doctrines ignore the dictates of valid jurisdictional and civil rights statutes and thus
usurp legislative authority in violation of separation of powers principles); Shreve, Fed-
eral Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 405-19 (1983)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has obscured and denigrated the meaning of federal
equity doctrine and overstepped its authority to refuse injunctions); Soifer & Macgill,
The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1143-
44, 1185-88 (1977) (contending that the Younger doctrine has eliminated the discre-
tionary balancing at the heart of equity and has distorted federalism and comity princi-
ples by requiring the federal courts always to give way); Weissman, The Discrimina-
tory Application of Penal Laws by State Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers: Playing
the Shell Game of Rights and Remedies, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 489, 492-94, 515-16
(1974) (asserting that federal injunctive relief must be available to curb racial discrimi-
nation in the application and enforcement of state penal laws by judicial and executive
officers because administrative controls and the power of the ballot are inadequate).
9 It may be helpful to note very briefly at the outset the sort of reform the author
favors. At the risk of oversimplification, he is essentially an advocate of the "Due Pro-
cess Model" of the criminal process. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 163-71 (1968). In the author's view, the greatest shortcomings in American
criminal justice are the lack of procedural due process and equal protection. See infra
notes 45-54 and accompanying text. Accordingly, reform should seek to ensure proce-
dural regularity and equality of treatment at all stages of the criminal process.
10 Prisoners' rights cases might be classified as criminal justice reform cases. Correc-
tions departments, which administer state prisons and pretrial detention facilities, are
components of state criminal justice systems. For purposes of this Article, however,
cases seeking systemic reform of state criminal justice systems are defined as cases seek-
ing change in the investigative or adjudicative phases of criminal justice.
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essential to achieve systemic reform of state criminal justice.
Section IV considers how the federal injunctive power can best be
used. It applies the lessons learned in other institutional reform cases to
litigation challenging criminal justice practices and procedures and sug-
gests guidelines to assist litigants and courts in structuring and adjudi-
cating such cases. Section IV also explains why abandoning Younger
abstention will neither seriously disrupt the state criminal process nor
overburden the federal courts.
I. CONTRASTING INTERVENTION IN DESEGREGATION,
REAPPORTIONMENT, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS SUITS WITH
ABSTENTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM CASES
A. Factors Making Federal Court Intervention in State
Institutions Appropriate and Necessary
Common factors underlie the federal courts' willingness to use their
equitable powers to desegregate schools, reapportion legislatures, and
reform prisons. In each instance, the federal courts acted because state
institutions denied fundamental constitutional rights. The offending
practices were deep-rooted, systemic, and national in scope. The prac-
tices were highly resistant - indeed, virtually impervious - to change
at the state level. Finally, reform was critical to the country as a whole.
State criminal justice systems exhibit the same characteristics that
made intervention in the other areas appropriate and necessary. The
administration of justice implicates fundamental rights. Criminal justice
problems are systemic and nationwide. The states are unwilling or un-
able to administer criminal justice fairly and efficiently. Finally, im-
provement in state administration of criminal justice is vital to the
health of the republic and long overdue. Therefore, abstention in cases
seeking reform of state criminal justice systems cannot be harmonized
with federal court intervention in desegregation, reapportionment, and
prisoners' rights suits.
1. School Desegregation
In Brown v. Board of Education (I),1" Chief Justice Warren stated
that education "is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities," and "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion. ' "2 Because "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual," segregated schools deny black school children equal protection
of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment.' When the
Court decided Brown, seventeen states and the District of Columbia
required racial segregation in schools and four other states permitted
racial segregation.'
Public opposition to school desegregation was widespread, particu-
larly in the deep South where segregation was a way of life. 6 Achiev-
ing change at the state level was unrealistic; Southerners were funda-
mentally opposed to integration.'" An outside influence was necessary
to break this vested tradition. And change was essential because an in-
12 Id. at 493. See also Milliken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("We deal here with the right of all of our children, whatever their race,
to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach their full potential as
citizens."); Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE
L.J. 995, 995 (1984) (noting that education is basic to the full exercise of first amend-
ment rights and the right to vote).
18 Brown v. Board of Educ. (I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
14 Id.
18 See Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools - 1953, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 377, 378 n.3 (1954), for a listing of the pertinent state statutes. One year later
during the oral argument in Brown v. Board of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the
Attorney General of Virginia told the Court that school desegregation "involved the
rights, the mode of life, the customs, the mores of 50 million people and 11 million
school children." ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
IN Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1952-55, at 432 (L. Friedman ed. 1969)
[hereafter ARGUMENT].
16 Racial segregation in schools "was an integral element in the Southern State[s']
general program to restrict Negroes as a class from participation in the life of the
community, the affairs of the State, and the mainstream of American life . .. ."
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 866 (5th Cir. 1966)
(Wisdom, J.). See also McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed" - A Study of School
Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 992-97 (1956); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court
and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-70: A History and Analysis; 64 VA. L.
REV. 485, 494-505 (1978). See generally W. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941).
17 See Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judi-
cial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 665 (1982) (asserting that the Supreme Court in-
tervened in the school cases "to protect against a possibly uncorrectable bias in the
political process").
"' "The impulse of obstruction was too ... deeply embedded politically, histori-
cally, socially, psychologically, economically, sexually, and in every other way." Wil-
kinson, supra note 16, at 501. Professor Wilkinson notes that fear of black domination
was acute in states with large black populations. Id. at 496-97. "Even the tiniest tear in
the fabric of segregation was certain to alarm . . . . [Sichooling, even more than voting,
raised the spectre of black rule. The literate Negro was a demanding Negro, asking and
getting who knows what." Id. at 494, 497. See also McKay, supra note 16, at 992-97.
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tegrated society required integrated schools. 9
2. Legislative Reapportionment
Reapportionment cases affirm the right to have one's vote weigh
equally with the votes of others. Reynolds v. Sims20 held that "[t]he
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of
a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the
heart of representative government."2 Historically, malapportionment
was the rule rather than the exception.22 In approximately two-thirds
of the states, constitutional restrictions on legislative representation
made equitable apportionment impossible in one or both state legisla-
tive houses. 23  In most other states, legislatures simply failed to
reapportion.
2 4
In Colegrove v. Green2" Justice Frankfurter suggested that the rem-
edy lay in the local electoral process. 26 As Professor Charles Black
'9 Segregated education "perpetuates the barriers between the races; stereotypes,
misunderstandings, hatred, and inability to communicate are all intensified." Fiss, Ra-
cial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV.
564, 570 (1965).
20 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
21 Id. at 555. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more
precious . . . . Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined."). See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81 (1963).
22 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946) ("Throughout our history ...
the most glaring disparities have prevailed as to the contours and the population of
[congressional] districts."). See also Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72
YALE L.J. 90, 90-92 (1962). In 1872, Congress enacted legislation requiring that
House members be elected from districts "containing as nearly as practicable an equal
number of inhabitants." Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28. But the law was not
enforced, and Congress eliminated the requirement in 1929. Act of June 18, 1929, ch.
28, 46 Stat. 21. See McKay, Reapportionment: the Success Story of the Warren Court,
67 MICH. L. REV. 223, 225 (1968). See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 555-56.
2' Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE
L.J. 23, 23 (1962).
24 Id. at 24. Statistics showing the vast scope of malapportionment in federal con-
gressional districts in the early 1960's can be found in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 49-50 (1964) (appendix to opinion of Harlan, J., dissenting). Similar statistics for
state legislative districts can be found in Goldberg, supra note 22, at 100-01 app. A.
The pent-up frustration with the problem was revealed by the flood of litigation fol-
lowing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which held reapportionment claims to be
justiciable in federal court. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 n.30 (1964), the
Court noted that litigation challenging state legislative apportionment schemes had be-
gun in 34 states within nine months of the decision in Baker v. Carr.
25 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
26 Id. at 554, 556.
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asked, however, "is this a practicable suggestion, when the wrong com-
plained of is the corruption of the electoral process?"" 7 Politicians,
whose seats were threatened by "one person, one vote"28 principles,
simply were not receptive to public demands for reapportionment.29
Since reapportionment required legislative action, reform efforts
were stymied.3 0 Reapportionment was particularly important in the
early 1960's when the Court first ordered reform. State legislatures
often were dominated by rural interests and were out of touch with
growing urban problems. 1 Rural legislators generally were unwilling
to attempt to solve urban social problems.3 2 Reapportionment was a
" Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v.
Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 14 (1962).
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1057, 1091 (1958); Sindler, supra note 23, at 28; Swygert, In Defense of Judicial
Activism, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 439, 451 (1982).
o Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 79 (1962);
Sindler, supra note 23, at 28. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, provides a dramatic exam-
ple of this phenomenon. The Tennessee constitution required equitable apportionment
among counties based on a decennial census. Id. at 188-89. Since 1901, however, pro-
posals for reapportionment had failed to pass either house of the state legislature de-
spite substantial growth and redistribution of the state's population. Id. at 191-92. Re-
apportionment required legislative approval, as did constitutional amendments, and
Tennessee had no popular initiative process. Id. at 193 n.14. The plaintiffs' claim that
change was "difficult or impossible," id. at 193, plainly had merit. Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), presented a similar fact pattern. Alabama's constitution also re-
quired apportionment of representatives among the counties of the state in accordance
with a census conducted every 10 years. Id. at 538-39. Reapportionment, however, had
not occurred since 1900, despite population shifts. Id. at 540. Although the Alabama
Supreme Court found that the state legislature had violated the state constitution, the
court was unwilling to order change. See id. at 540-41 nn.4-5 and cases cited therein.
The United States Supreme Court concluded: "Legislative inaction, coupled with the
unavailability of any political or judicial remedy, had resulted, with the passage of
years, in the perpetuated scheme becoming little more than an irrational anachronism."
Id. at 570. Similar problems existed in Virginia. See Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678,
689-90 (1964).
"' See Harvey, Reapportionments of State Legislatures - Legal Requirements, 17
LAW & CONTEMP. PRORS. 364, 364 (1952); Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reap-
portionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7, 10-11 (1962).
3' Note, Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of Standards,
72 YALE L.J. 968, 979-80 (1963) [hereafter Note, Problem of Standards]. See also E.
BANFIELD & M. GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
99 (1958) ("Almost everywhere city officials assert that indifference or ignorance on the
part of rural representatives in state legislatures frustrates action on metropolitan
problems by withholding essential powers from the cities."); Schattschneider, supra
note 31, at 11.
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precondition to addressing these unpopular urban issues. 8 As with seg-
regated schools, malapportioned legislatures required a disinterested
outside force to set them straight.
3. Prisoners' Rights
Federal courts have intervened in state prisons to vindicate a broad
range of constitutional rights. The courts have redressed violations of
prisoners' first amendment rights of free speech and religion, eighth
amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and
fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the
laws.'" The many lawsuits concerning prison conditions demonstrate
the national scope of the problem.3 By 1981, courts had held individ-
ual prisons or entire prison systems in twenty-four states to violate the
Constitution, and litigation was pending in many other states. 6
Federal court action has been necessary because citizens and local
politicians often oppose prison reform. Increased alarm over crime
makes the public unsympathetic.3 " Prisoners' lack of economic and po-
litical power and the low visibility of prisons make prison reform a low
priority for legislative and executive officials. 8 When lawmakers at-
" In more immediate political terms, the rural dominance in state legislatures and in
Congress threatened the Kennedy Administration's New Frontier programs. President
Kennedy strongly favored reapportionment. See Transcript of the President's News
Conference on Domestic and World Affairs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1962, at 12, cols. 3-
4.
" See Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role
for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367, 368 (1977) [hereafter
Comment, Confinement] and cases cited therein. See generally Project, Criminal Proce-
dure, 69 GEo. L.J. 211, 591-614 (1980).
Chief Justice Burger has called correctional institutions "the most neglected phase
of our system of criminal justice . . . ." Burger, Our Options Are Limited, 18 VILL. L.
REV. 165, 165 (1972). See also Burger, Commencement Address, 4 PACE L. REV. 1, 4
(1983). Justice Brennan believes lack of resources is the "core" problem in administer-
ing prisons. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 357 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See also D. SKOLER, ORGANIZING THE NON-SYsTEM 7 (1977) ("Resources and facili-
ties have lagged behind accepted standards of adequacy ...."). Traditionally, only a
small fraction of criminal justice dollars is allocated to prisons. See Comment, The Role
of the Eighth Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 649 (1971)
[hereafter Comment, Role of Eighth Amendment] and sources cited therein. See gener-
ally Symposium: Prison Crowding, 1984 U. ILL. L.F. 203-422.
S Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353-54 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
'7 Comment, Confinement, supra note 34, at 386-87; Comment, Role of Eighth
Amendment, supra note 35, at 650.
" Comment, Role of Eighth Amendment, supra note 35, at 650, 653-54
("[C]orrectional reform is often considered by public officials to be a secondary respon-
[Vol. 19:31
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tempt prison reform, the responses have ranged from outright resis-
tance" to an unenthusiastic, grudging acquiescence that leads to little
actual improvement.' 0 An additional impediment to reform is that some
states fragment responsibility for prisons among many different
agencies.4
1
Notwithstanding the difficulty of prison reform, it is critical to the
quality of American life. Approximately ninety-five percent of prison-
ers return to the community after an average prison stay of twenty-one
sibility."); Comment, Confinement, supra note 34, at 386-87. See also Rhem v. Mal-
colm, 507 F.2d 333, 342 (2d Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 421
(N.D. Tex. 1972); Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison
Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841, 844 (1971). State officials routinely ignore calls for re-
form from professional and civic groups. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,
324, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (The court noted that none of the standards recommended
by a 1972 study had been implemented and concluded: "The Alabama legislature has
had ample opportunity to make provision for the state to meet its constitutional respon-
sibilities in this area, and it has failed to do so."); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 681 (D. Mass. 1973) (In ordering Boston's Charles
Street Jail closed, the court noted that "[diuring the past quarter century, seven sepa-
rate governmental commissions studied Charles Street and condemned it. Most of them
recommended that it be abandoned and a new facility constructed."), affd, 494 F.2d
1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp.
93, 97 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972).
19 See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 410-11, 414-15 (E.D. Okla.
1974) (warden ignored Department of Corrections directives to integrate prison facili-
ties and to cease using chemical agents for punitive purposes); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 369 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ("The legislation adopted in 1967 and 1968 and Act
377 of 1969 establishing the Tucker Intermediate Reformatory are forward looking;
but at least as yet they have not had any significant impact on the distinctive character-
istics of the Arkansas penal system . . . ."), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
40 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582, 592 (D.P.R. 1976) ("The
conditions described in these findings have been known to defendants for some time.
The minimal corrective measures have been very recent and have not addressed the
basic inadequacies of La Princesa."); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 714
(N.D. Ohio 1971) ("The sad reality is that much of the present difficulty stems from a
defensive clinging to outmoded usages, and the failure to use some ingenuity or imagi-
nation toward making the best use of what is already at hand."), affd sub nom. Jones
v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
4' See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. at 98 ("The evidence makes it abun-
dantly clear that with the fragmentation of authority among all three branches of the
state government, it would be a tremendous triumph of hope over reality to think that
what has been developed in more than a century by conflicting political interests and by
public indifference and hostility will be changed by those who are completely embroiled
in the resultant mess."). See generally D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 212-13.
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months. "2 If, as is often contended, prisons not only fail to rehabilitate
but instead make inmates more destructive than when they entered
prison, "a crime will continue to plague America."' The federal courts
have deemed it a sufficiently critical problem to justify intervention.
4. Criminal Justice
State criminal justice systems require reform by the federal courts for
essentially the same reasons that segregated schools, malapportioned
legislatures, and inhumane prisons have required federal court inter-
vention. Criminal justice practices and procedures implicate a host of
constitutional rights. The due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment require that indigent defendants be accorded
the same resources as wealthy defendants to mount a defense.45 No one,
however, would seriously assert that rich and poor "stand on an equal-
ity before the bar of justice in every American court. '' 48 Due process
requires that the important decisions affecting an accused's personal
freedom be made only after full consideration of all relevant facts at an
"' Fox, Institutional Confinement: Countdown To Explosion, in D. SHANAHAN,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 316, 318 (1977);
Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights
Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 473 (1971).
"' See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 11 (1967); Fox, supra note
42, at 318; Comment, Role of Eighth Amendment, supra note 35, at 647-48.
4 According to one study, 67% of released prisoners were rearrested within three
years of their release; of these, 40 to 50% were ultimately convicted. See D. SKOLER,
supra note 35, at 13. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 45-46 (1967) [hereafter THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME]. Fear of crime has con-
tinued to increase in recent years. See R. RHODES, THE INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS OF
CRIME 17 (1977).
' Indigent defendants must be granted equal access to the instruments needed to
vindicate legal rights. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956). The outcome of criminal cases may not hinge on an accused's lack
of wealth. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d
143 (2d Cir. 1971); White v. Gilligan, 351 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
" Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 241 (1940)). For discussions of the different treatment accorded rich and poor
defendants, see generally L. KATZ, L. LITwIN, & R. BAMBERGER, JUSTICE IS THE
CRIME, PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES (1972); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 50-51 (1967) [hereafter TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS]; P. WICE,




on-the-record hearing in which the defendant is represented by counsel
before an impartial magistrate. 7 The system often omits these
safeguards.
4 8
Procedural safeguards and adequate fact-finding are necessary to ef-
fectuate the eighth amendment right to nonexcessive bail, the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and the fourth
amendment right to be arrested and detained only upon probable
cause."9 Moreover, incarceration involves one of the most basic rights,
"the freedom to be free." 0 Plainly, then, abstention in criminal justice
cases cannot be justified on the ground that the rights involved are less
fundamental than in the other areas in which federal courts have
' When a person faces potential adverse governmental action, deciding what process
is due involves measuring "the extent to which (the person] may be 'condemned to
suffer grievous loss,' " and determining "whether [the person's] interest in avoiding that
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). Criminal defendants face loss of freedom, while the govern-
mental interest in summary adjudication is merely monetary. Assembly line justice ex-
ists because the states have allocated their resources elsewhere. See NATIONAL ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON
COURTS (1973) [hereafter REPORT ON COURTS]; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS, supra note 46, at 31-32. In the correctional context, the courts have consist-
ently' held that lack of resources cannot justify denial of constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 687 (D. Mass. 1973); Brenneman v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp.
1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
"' See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
49 As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[tihe history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 347 (1943).
"0 United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 998 (1972). Subsumed under that basic right are the freedom to walk and
drive about, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), to travel inter-
state, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to associate with persons of one's own
choice, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
Persons incarcerated through the criminal process also lose "the right to be let
alone," which Justice Brandeis viewed as the "most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (dissenting opinion). Privacy, as the Supreme Court has recognized, is a funda-
mental right protected by the Bill of Rights. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972). Prisoners, however, have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells, and thus are not entitled to the
protection of the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hud-
son v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3199-3201 (1984).
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intervened.
The problems with the administration of justice are deep-rooted, sys-
temic, and national in scope.5" They stem from resources insufficient to
handle the heavy flow of cases. The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded: "America's sys-
tem of criminal justice is . . .overworked, undermanned, [and] under-
financed . . . ." The system also lacks coordination, both within each
component (such as the prosecution or the police) and among compo-
nents.5 Thus, the criminal justice system can be fragmented and
decentralized."
These underlying problems badly distort the criminal process. They
cause chronic delay at virtually all points in the system.55 They also
The problems have been studied in recent years by a succession of national com-
missions and professional groups. For example, The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a ten volume study in 1967, and The
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals produced six
volumes in 1973. In addition, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions issued a series of reports on criminal justice problems, including MAKING THE
SAFE STREETS ACT WORK (1970); SAFE STREETS RECONSIDERED: THE BLOCK
GRANT EXPERIENCE 1968-1975 (1977); STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1971); and The American Bar Association's Project on Minimum
Standards in the Administration of Justice also issued reports.
" See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 12. The President's Commis-
sion stated: "It is not only judges who are in short supply. There are not enough prose-
cutors, defense counsel, and probation officers. . .. The deluge of cases is reflected in
every aspect of the courts' work, from overcrowded corridors and courtrooms to the long
calendars. . . ." See TASK FORCE REPORT: TIE COURTS, supra note 46, at 31. See
also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL 1 (1967); REPORT ON
COURTS, supra note 47, at 1. The problem of insufficient resources has, if anything,
worsened in the years since these reports were issued. See M. FEELEY, COURT RE-
FORM ON TRIAL xi (1983); Kaufman, The Judicial System, Ailing, Needs Help, N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1984, at A19, col. 1; N.Y. ST. B.A., Courts Need More Resources, 26
STATE B. NEWS 1 (1984); City's Courts Clogged by Increase in Cases and Lack of
Judges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 1;Justice System in State Found Near-
ing Chaos, Study Panel Asserts It Is "Choking on Numbers," N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1981, at BI, col. 6; The Crime-Without-Punishment Crisis, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1981, at BI, col. 4.
'3 UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 138 (1971); see also
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 7-12. See infra notes 65-67 and accom-
panying text.
4 See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 7, 10-12.
" See L. KATZ, L. LITwIN, & R. BAMBERGER, supra note 46, at 2, 4 ("The courts
are filled with criminal cases that never seem to end . . . .Delay has become the
byword of the justice system."). See also REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 47, at 1, 16,
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create enormous pressure to dispose of cases quickly in the early stages
of the proceedings.5 6 Consequently, the traditional criminal process
characterized by formal procedures and culminating in a public trial
has been replaced by an informal, largely invisible process of adminis-
trative plea and sentence bargaining.5" Often without adequate infor-
mation or basic procedural protection for the defendant, courts make
decisions concerning such matters as whether there is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed,5 what bail should be imposed,59
66 ("Backlogs are enormous .... Delay in the formal processing of accused persons is
a chronic problem for the judicial system."). Reformers have urged that the period from
arrest to trial in felony cases should be as little as 60 days, id. at 68; however, it is
common for 10 to 12 months to elapse between the apprehension of an accused and the
disposition of her case. Id. at 66.
" THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 128 ("An inevitable consequence
of volume . . is the almost total preoccupation . . . with the movement of cases.");
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 31 ("[Tihe agencies adminis-
tering criminal justice sometimes become preoccupied simply with moving the cases.
Clearing the dockets becomes a primary objective of all concerned, and cases are dis-
missed, guilty pleas are entered, and bargains are struck with that end as the dominant
consideration.").
51 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 4. See also REPORT ON
COURTS, supra note 47, at 15-16. A "plea of guilty is probably the most frequent
method of conviction in all jurisdictions; in some localities as many as 95% of the crimi-
nal cases are disposed of in this way." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY I-
2 (1968).
In most jurisdictions in the United States the preliminary hearing is not a
useful factfinding device . . . .In many places testimony at the hearing is
not recorded or otherwise perpetuated. In some jurisdictions the defense
does not have the right to subpoena witnesses, and quite often counsel is
not appointed for the accused until the time for the preliminary hearing
has passed.
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 43.
" Pretrial release conditions must be set in cases that cannot be disposed of at the
initial court appearance. Although the defendant's freedom is at stake, bail decisions are
usually made in a matter of minutes, or even seconds, solely on the basis of the serious-
ness of the charge and the defendant's prior record, but without consideration of the
accused's roots in the community, her financial status, or the weight of the evidence
against her. See McCree, Bail and the Indigent Defendant, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4. See
also THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 131-33; TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 30. The shortcomings in the administration of the
money bail system in America have been widely documented. See generally D. FREED
& P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 (1964); P. WICE, supra note 46;
Comment, Administration of Pretrial Release and Detention: A Proposal for Unifica-
tion, 83 YALE L.J. 153 (1973).
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whether a plea of guilty should be entered,"' and what sentence is ap-
propriate."' These deficiencies in criminal justice practices and proce-
dures are as broad as the problems in other areas in which the federal
courts have intervened.
Criminal justice systems have proved to be as resistant to change at
the state level as segregated schools, malapportioned legislatures, and
inhumane prisons. Despite many proposals for reform, remarkably lit-
tle change has occurred in the day-to-day operation of state criminal
justice systems in the last twenty years. 2 Public pressure has not been
an effective catalyst for reform."3 The public also sends conflicting sig-
nals: one segment demands greater emphasis on crime control while
another segment demands procedural fairness and greater equality in
the treatment of offenders."
Resistance to change may be inherent in the structure of the criminal
justice system. Because power is fragmented among the major compo-
o Few practices in the criminal justice system create more unease and suspicion
among both defendants and the public than the negotiated guilty plea, particularly
when the plea is entered in the early stages of a prosecution. TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 9. See Plea Bargaining - The Tough Choices Prose-
cutors Must Make, LIFE, Oct., 1983, at 33. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 57; D.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL (1966); Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179 (1975); Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 108 app. A; Comment, Judicial Supervision over
California Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trade, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 962 (1971).
Guilty pleas may be coerced by threatening lengthy incarceration or high bail if a
defendant asserts her innocence, while offering a short sentence or even probation if the
defendant pleads promptly. See TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 46, at
30. See also ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON A-rICA 30-31 (1972).
"1 Defendants convicted at an early court appearance, whether by plea of guilty or
trial, are often sentenced on the spot, without presentence reports or investigations, on
the basis of the charges, their demeanor, and their prior record. TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 31.
e2 See Murphy, Foreword, in D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at xvii. Reformers have
proposed change in virtually all phases of the criminal justice system. For extensive
discussion of reform proposals, see sources cited supra note 51.
13 See Allen, Central Problems of American Criminal Justice, 75 MICH. L. REV.
813, 814 (1977) (Public discussion of criminal justice issues often "is characterized by a
partisanship that frequently trivializes the issues presented and denies depth and bal-
ance to our consideration.").
64 S. WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE 251 (1980). See J. Wilson, N.Y. Times, July 17,
1983, § 4 (The Week in Review) at 6, col. 5 (noting that in many cities there is no
organized constituency for improvement in the criminal justice system).
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nents, 65 central administration is impossible. In most states the prosecu-
tor is a virtually autonomous elected official serving at the district or
county level." Separation of powers precludes both executive control of
the courts and court control of police and other executive agencies.67 In
addition, state legislatures often are reluctant to increase the size of the
coordinate judicial branch." Because no single state agency has the
power to order the components to coordinate their actions, broad reform
is difficult to achieve.6"
The conflict between prosecution and defense inherent in the adver-
sary system also frustrates reform efforts.7 ' The fifth amendment and
the attorney-client privilege isolate the defendant and defense counsel
from the other parts of the system. Thus, interested parties view with
suspicion attempts to combine the prosecution and defense functions in
one agency." In addition, sharing of resources such as computers is
fraught with danger .7
Power fragmentation and administrative decentralization magnify
and reinforce the already substantial differences in outlook, values, and
goals of the people working in different parts of the criminal justice
system. Police, prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and other partici-
pants in the criminal process all play different roles and have different
e See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 4 (1981); D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at
138; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 148.
n7 M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 12-13; R. RHODES, supra note 44, at 50; D.
SKOLER supra note 35, at 31; Misner, Criminal Justice Education: The Unifying
Force? in D. SHANAHAN, supra note 42, at 20, 26.
" See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 685 (D.
Mass. 1973):
During the past five years, chief justices of the Superior Court and bar
association officers have made annual pilgrimages to legislative commit-
tees, seeking increases in the number of Superior Court judges and staff,
justifiable by every national standard of judicial administration. The total
annual cost . . . would be less than the cost of constructing a single mile
of superhighway. Yet since 1967 the legislators have turned a deaf ear.
e Reform within particular components also is frustrated by decentralization and by
autonomy of individual units. D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 143; THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME, supra note 44, at 148-49.
70 M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 11-12; D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 34; Dawson,
The Need For a Systems Approach to Justice Administration, in D. SHANAHAN, supra
note 42, at 6, 8-9.
71 D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 34.
" The prospect of prosecutors and defense attorneys rummaging around in each
other's data bases would doubtless alarm members of both agencies.
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interests.7 Consequently, each agency develops a unique structure and
operating approach.7 4 Also, because the concept of progress is subjec-
tive, 7 5 what one group sees as progress another may see as a step in the
wrong direction. 76 Finally, the substantial discretion granted the per-
sonnel of each component makes coordination difficult. 7 Discretionary
authority also tends to be jealously guarded. Criticism of one compo-
nent by representatives of others typically causes members of the criti-
cized agency to close ranks instead of undertaking an honest self-
examination. a
State courts are unwilling or unable to order systemic reform of state
criminal justice systems. They are ill-suited to the task. The judicial
selection process in most states does not produce uniformly well-quali-
fied judges.7 9 In addition, state judges often lack expertise in the subtle-
ties of federal and constitutional law. State judges tend to focus on state
73 R. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEMS CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTS 17-18 (1978); R. RHODES, supra note 44, at 7; Dawson, supra
note 70, at 11; Misner, supra note 67, at 26.
71 H. MORE & R. CHANG, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35 (1974).
75 M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 19.
71 R. NIMMER, supra note 73, at 17-18.
77 Id. at 27-29; D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 48-50; Dawson, supra note 70, at 11.
See George, Screening, Diversion and Mediation in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1984) (describing the exercise of discretion by police and prosecutors);
Lezak & Leonard, The Prosecutor's Discretion: Out of the Closet - Not Out of Con-
trol, 63 OR. L. REV. 247 (1984) (describing the exercises of discretion by prosecutors).
7" Dawson, supra note 70, at 10-11. Consider, for example, the reaction of Phil
Caruso, President of the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, to the
Congressional hearing on police brutality held in Harlem in September, 1983: "The
entire Congressional inquisition was a contrived, transparent political sham, well-
orchestrated to achieve a self-serving end. A further pall was cast over the proceedings
by the fact that the 'Grand Inquisitor' himself, Representative John Conyers, is an
acknowledged anti-police advocate." Letter of Phil Caruso, editorial page, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1983, at A30, col. 3. Mr. Caruso's letter continued with sarcastic rather than
constructive suggestions to address alleged weaknesses in New York City's Civilian
Complaint Review Board. For example, Mr. Caruso suggested that Mayor Koch and
Police Commissioner McGuire should "regularly traverse the streets of minority com-
munities equipped with bullhorns so that they may motivate, exhort and solicit com-
plaints." Id. at col. 5.
79 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (1977) ("Neither
elections nor an appointment process based largely on political patronage is calculated
to make refined judgments on technical competence."). See also M. FEELEY, THE PRO-
CESS Is THE PUNISHMENT 63-65 (1979); M. LEVIN, URBAN POLITICS AND THE
CRIMINAL COURTS 13-14 (1977). The patronage system also adversely affects the




law issues. Their decisions on federal issues rarely are reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court.80 State judges also are susceptible to
majoritarian or political pressures when deciding constitutional cases
because they are elected or appointed for fixed terms.8" In addition,
state judges may be biased in reviewing the actions of other state
officials."s
State trial judges, particularly in the lower criminal courts, often are
too close to the problems. They frequently handle troubling fact pat-
terns that make for a jaded approach to constitutional rights.83 Lower
court judges typically are preoccupied with rapid evaluation and dispo-
sition of individual cases and usually cannot afford time to consider
broad constitutional challenges.8 Similar considerations make state
habeas corpus proceedings and individual appeals ineffective in re-
forming state criminal justice.8 5Moreover, many of the deficiencies in state criminal justice are cen-
tered in the courts. It is unrealistic to expect state judges to be receptive
to constitutional challenges to their own practices and procedures, just
8o M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 2 (1980); Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 1352, 1356-57 (1970). Moreover, many state judges "appear to acknowledge only
an obligation not to disobey clearly established [federal] law." Neuborne, supra note
79, at 1125. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). In Cleaver,
plaintiffs challenged the California practice of conducting child dependency proceedings
without assigning counsel to indigent parents. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain-
tiffs' claim would "not receive an effective hearing and vindication in a state proceed-
ing" because "[tihe California courts have repeatedly denied or refused to hear these
claims in the past." Id. at 943-44.
SI M. REDISH, supra note 80, at 2-3; Neuborne, supra note 79, at 1127-28. See also
M. LEVIN, supra note 79, at 13; McMillan, Abstention - The Judiciary's Self-In-
flicted Wound, 56 N.C.L. REV. 527, 544 (1978); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in
the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158 (1953).
82 Chevigny, supra note 80, at 1358 ("[Tjhere is an inherent potential for bias when
a state judge . . . reviews actions of other state officials."). See also Comment, Protect-
ing Fundamental Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 86 (1977). Cf Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577
(1973) (Supreme Court found Alabama State Board of Optometry "incompetent by
reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it").
8 Neuborne, supra note 79, at 1125.
8 See M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 38-39; Zeigler, supra note 1, at 305.
8' Neither individual appeals nor individual state habeas corpus proceedings can
achieve systemic reform. The reviewing court can only reverse a conviction or order the
petitioner's release from illegal detention; it cannot grant prospective injunctive relief
requiring changes in state practices and procedures. The inherent shortcomings of Su-
preme Court review of state court decisions and of federal habeas corpus as a remedial
device for achieving systemic reform are examined in detail infra Section III.
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as it was unrealistic to expect state legislators to be receptive to calls for
reapportionment."' In Rose v. Mitchell,"7 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that state courts should not be solely responsible for reviewing
their own conduct. Rose refused to extend the rule of Stone v. Powell 8
to preclude federal habeas corpus review of racial discrimination claims
in state grand jury selection procedures. The Court doubted that
"claims that the state judiciary itself has purposely violated the Equal
Protection Clause . . . in general will receive the type of full and fair
hearing deemed essential to the holding of Stone.""9 The Court con-
cluded that "[f]ederal habeas review is necessary to ensure that consti-
tutional defects in the state judiciary's grand jury selection procedure
are not overlooked by the very state judges who operate that system." 90
Finally, the procedure codes of many states discourage institutional
reform litigation. For example, many states still follow class action
rules based on the Field Code that require a near identity of interest
among class members. 1 Members of a class of criminal defendants,
however, have separate and distinct rather than common and undivided
interests."' Thus, the class action device is of little use in states still
"0 See Weissman, supra note 8, at 542 (asserting that when a state trial judge herself
is the subject of the challenge, it is not reasonable to assume the judge will adequately
protect constitutional rights).
67 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
a 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the Court held that federal courts could no longer
entertain habeas petitions claiming fourth amendment violations if the state courts had
provided an opportunity for a full and fair hearing of the claim because state trial and
appellate courts are as capable of reviewing police actions as federal habeas courts. Id.
at 481-82, 493-95.
19 443 U.S. at 561.
0 Id. at 563.
" See Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 612-19 (1971).
9' Early American cases followed English practice in requiring that class members
have indivisible interests; that is, "if they sued separately, each [would] assert the same
interest in whatever property or other entitlement was at issue." Developments in the
Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1332 (1976) (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Ayres v. Carver, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 591, 594 (1855); Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1853); New London Bank v. Lee, 11 Conn. 112, 120
(1835); Louisville & Old Topeka R.R. v. Ballard, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 165, 171 (1859).
See also Z. CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 200-03 (1950). Until recently,
New York's class action statute required "a question of common or general interest."
N.Y. Clv. PRAC. R. 1005(a) (McKinney) (repealed 1975). New York courts construed
that phrase to require privity between class members. Homburger, The 1975 New York
Judical Conference Package: Class Actions and Comparative Negligence, 25 BUFFALO
L. REV. 415, 421-22 (1976). As the Court of Appeals stated in Society Milion Athena,
Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1939):
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clinging to the old usages. Even in states with modern rules that re-
quire only "questions of law or fact common to the class,""3 judicial
hostility has severely limited use of class actions. "4
Reform of American criminal justice is critical to the quality of life.
The costs of crime are enormous. The total annual crime bill has been
estimated in excess of sixty billion dollars.' 5 The National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals concluded that
''crime in America is seriously interfering with the Nation's ability to
attain economic, political, and social well-being for all its citizens."'
Crime causes trauma, both physical and psychological. 9' It also causes
a breakdown in the sense of community by making people wary of their
neighbors and reluctant to venture beyond their locked doors."8 In addi-
tion, as Judge John J. Gibbons asserts: "No federal guaranty of mini-
mum levels of equality [can] be viable [if] the state criminal justice sys-
tems, so riddled with inequality . . .remain unscrutinized."" Finally,
"Separate wrongs to separate persons, though committed by similar means and even
pursuant to a single plan, do not alone create a common or general interest in those
who are wronged." See also Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 402,
259 N.E.2d 720, 722, 311 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 284 (1970).
01 See, e.g., 16 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23(a)(2) (1973); 7A COLO. REV. STAT. §
23(a)(2) (1977).
" New York, for example, enacted a modem class action statute with some fanfare
in 1975. Professor David Siegel described the statute as "an enlightened and powerful
one, in some respects more ambitious than Federal Rule 23, on which it is largely (but
not entirely) based." D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 174 (1978). Governor Carey
described the legislation as an "historic advance for the people of New York," and
stated that "[tlhe present law and its precursors have caused extraordinary judicial
confusion extending over the past 125 years and have resulted in needlessly restricting
meaningful access to state courts for countless people." Governor's Memorandum,
June 17, 1975, filed with A. 1252-B, 198th Sess., Reg. Sess. (1975), in N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1975, at 1748. Yet despite initial hopes for liberal construction of the new rule,
D. SIEGEL, supra, at 173-76, the state courts construed it narrowly. See discussion and
cases cited in Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 A.D.2d 83, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2d
Dept. 1980) (reviewing negative judicial attitude towards class actions). Accord Martin
v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976); Jackson v. Blum,
79 A.D.2d 1076, 436 N.Y.S.2d 358 (3d Dept. 1981).
98 D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 12.
" REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 47, at 1.
9 D. SKOLER, supra note 35, at 13.
"Id. See also J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 26 (1983); Gray, The Costs of
Crime: Review and Overview, in THE COSTS OF CRIME 13, 20-22 (C. Gray ed. 1979);
Skogan, On Attitudes and Behaviors, in REACTIONS TO CRIME (D. Lewis ed.) 19, 29
(1981). Research suggests that crime has a greater impact on women than on men.
Riger, On Women, in REACTIONS TO CRIME, supra, at 47.
" Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SurFOLt U.L. REV. 1087, 1098 (1978).
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when a system performs as badly as the American criminal justice sys-
tem, eventually the citizenry must begin to question the integrity and
credibility of the entire legal system.1"'
Reform of state criminal justice systems therefore is no less important
to the basic health of the republic than was reform of other state insti-
tutions. Given the states' continuing inaction, the federal courts should
act as they have in the other areas to bring about needed change.
B. Inconsistent Federal Court Responses to Calls for Intervention
in State Institutions
Even though state criminal justice systems merit intervention in the
same way that schools, state legislatures and state prisons do, the fed-
eral court response to calls for aid has been radically different. In de-
segregation, reapportionment, and prisoners' rights cases, the federal
courts intervened, notwithstanding the strong traditions of local control
and the probable political and practical difficulties in achieving reform.
In each area the courts reversed traditions of noninvolvement. The sep-
arate-but-equal doctrine was abandoned in school desegregation cases,
and well-entrenched abstention doctrines were abrogated in reappor-
tionment and prisoners' rights cases. Concerns that previously had sup-
ported abstention became matters to be weighed in the wise exercise of
equitable discretion. In the criminal justice area, on the other hand,
Younger abstention has flourished. The federal courts generally have
refused to intervene directly in suits seeking systemic reform of state
criminal justice systems. The divergence in approach is striking, and
ultimately irrational.
1. School Desegregation
Justice Powell explained the strength of the policies underlying local
control of schools in Milliken v. Bradley (I): "No single tradition in
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the oper-
ation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to
the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools
and to quality of the educational process."1 During the oral argument
in Brown v. Board of Education (I), local school representatives told
the Supreme Court in graphic detail that court-ordered desegregation
100 Allen, supra note 63, at 819.
101 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974). See also San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 486.
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would be resisted10 2 and that attempts to force compliance would cause
violence and chaos.103 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ordered integra-
tion."4 Prior to the Brown litigation, federal court involvement in
school desegregation was stymied by the separate-but-equal doctrine.
By declaring that "[sleparate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual,"105 the Court opened the doors of the lower federal courts to de-
segregation actions.106
The Court remained sensitive to concerns of federalism and comity
102 See, e.g., Argument of S.E. Rogers, Counsel for Clarendon County, South Caro-
lina school district, reprinted in ARGUMENT, supra note 15, at 414 (contending white
citizens would refuse to send white children to black schools); Argument of Archibald
G. Robertson, Counsel for Prince Edward County, Virginia school system, reprinted in
id. at 430 (suggesting localities might refuse to vote money for schools, refuse to sup-
port necessary laws, and repeal usual public attendance laws).
103 See, e.g., Argument of Robert McC. Figg, Counsel for Clarendon County, South
Carolina school district, reprinted in id. at 423; Argument of Archibald G. Robertson,
Counsel for Prince Edward County, Virginia school system, reprinted in id. at 424-25;
Argument of I. Beverly Lake, North Carolina Assistant Attorney General, reprinted in
id. at 460 (asserting that ordering immediate compliance would destroy the public
school system in their locales); and Argument of Richard Ervin, Florida Attorney Gen-
eral, reprinted in id. at 441 (warning of serious violence if immediate integration
ordered).
Counsel in Brown (II) explained other practical difficulties in administering change.
See, e.g., Argument of Ralph E. Odum, Florida Assistant Attorney General, reprinted
in id. at 445-47. The opinion in Brown II recognized the need for ongoing district
court supervision to consider "problems related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revi-
sion of school districts ...and revision of local laws and regulations which may be
necessary in solving the foregoing problems." Brown v. Board of Educ. (II), 349 U.S.
294, 300-01 (1955).
1 4 349 U.S. at 301.
105 Brown v. Board of Educ. (I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
I" The federal courts also refused opportunities to abstain in school desegregation
cases. One of the cases consolidated in Brown (I) challenged provisions of South Caro-
lina law making it a crime to integrate a public school. Id. at 486-87. The plaintiffs'
request for prospective injunctive relief against enforcement of a state criminal statute
might have been denied under earlier cases in the Younger line, such as Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), and Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926),
but the Supreme Court did not discuss the issue. Subsequently, the Court affirmed a
lower court decision enjoining the operation of a Louisiana criminal statute designed to
enforce segregation in the public schools. See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F.
Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961) (three-judge court), affd per curiam sub nom. Gremillion
v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961). Cf Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102, 103 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958) (rejecting abstention, courts enjoined enforce-
ment of state statutes and municipal ordinances containing criminal sanctions designed
to maintain segregated public carriers); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 713
(M.D. Ala.) (three-judge court), affd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
1985]
University of California, Davis
that counseled restraint in addressing the problem of racial segregation
in schools. Brown (I) took the unusual step of ordering further argu-
ment the following term on the question of remedy."0 7 Ultimately, the
Court remanded the cases consolidated in Brown (I) to the district
courts to administer relief1 08 and specifically counseled the lower courts
to be flexible and to consider local circumstances:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise
of these traditional attributes of equity power."
Thus, courts did not ignore the principles of federalism and comity that
previously had precluded intervention in local school systems. Instead
courts recast these principles as factors to be weighed in framing appro-
priate equitable remedies.
In recent years the Supreme Court has retreated from its aggressive
stance on school desegregation cases. Plaintiffs have difficulty challeng-
ing de facto discrimination because the Court requires a very clear
showing that racial imbalance directly results from intentional discrimi-
nation by school officials."' School segregation caused by residential
housing patterns is more difficult to redress because the Court has lim-
ited the use of busing as a remedial tool."' The Burger Court plainly
casts the balance differently than the Warren Court." 2 The Supreme
107 347 U.S. at 495-96.
108 Brown v. Board of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
100 Id. at 300. The Court elaborated on the proper exercise of equitable power in
school desegregation cases 16 years later in Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (1971):
Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies . . . . [A] school desegrega-
tion case does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the
framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right.
The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective inter-
ests, the condition that offends the Constitution.
11 See, e.g., Dayton Board of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (holding
plaintiffs had failed to show that the racial imbalance in the Dayton, Ohio schools was
the result of intentionally segregative actions); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding lower court may not order desegregation in school district
subject to earlier desegregation order without fresh proof of discriminatory intent).
"' See, e.g., Metropolitan School Dist. v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) (lower
court decision ordering interdistrict busing vacated); Milliken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (same).
112 See generally Jones, The Desegregation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After
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Court has not, however, ordered abstention in school cases or shown
any inclination to reinstate the separate-but-equal doctrine.
2. Reapportionment
Legislative apportionment also was traditionally a matter of exclu-
sive state concern. 1 3 Given widespread malapportionment, 1 ' the deci-
sion in Baker v. Carr"5 making apportionment challenges justiciable
in federal courts was bound to have a broad impact.' 16 In addition, the
decision was almost certain to generate a flood of litigation because of
the political stakes involved.' 17  In a forceful dissent, Justice
Frankfurter stressed the practical difficulties the lower courts would
face in entertaining these suits. He accused the majority of "cata-
pult[ing] the lower courts" into a "mathematical quagmire" without
sufficient guidance or standards." 8 Yet despite the problems, the fed-
eral courts entered the political thicket and began reapportioning
America's legislative bodies." 9
Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 515 (1984).
1"3 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277-80 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,
552-53 (1946). Early federal legislation requiring equitable apportionment of congres-
sional districts was not enforced and eventually was repealed. See id. at 555-56; supra
note 22.
114 See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
"l 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
u Professor McCloskey observed of Baker: "[I]t is hard to recall a decision in mod-
ern history which has had such an immediate and significant effect on the practical
course of events, or . . . which seems to contain such a potential for influencing that
course in the future." McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 54, 56 (1962).
17 See infra note 118 and accompanying text. The Court was aware of the political
implications of its decision because nearly all of the amicus briefs described how malap-
portionment affected urban areas. Note, Problem of Standards, supra note 32, at 980
n.60.
118 369 U.S at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter continued:
Room continues to be allowed for weighting. This of course implies that
geography, economics, urban-rural conflict, and all the other non-legal
factors which have throughout our history entered into political districting
are to some extent not to be ruled out in the undefined vista now opened
up by review in the federal courts of state reapportionments. To some
extent - aye, there's the rub.
Id. at 269. See also Emerson, supra note 30, at 65-66 (The Court acted despite "the
violently partisan nature of the problem, the elusiveness of standards, the possible repu-
diation of judicial efforts to frame a remedy, the long line of contrary decisions behind
which it could have hidden and much scholarly advice to stick to the 'passive' virtues.").
"" Baker was handed down on March 26, 1962. 369 U.S. 186. Within seven weeks
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Before Baker v. Carr, the federal courts had consistently abstained
in reapportionment cases, relying on the political question doctrine.12
Courts treated reapportionment cases as nonjusticiable because they
threatened to enmesh the federal judiciary in the political process.12" '
Baker v. Carr abruptly rejected abstention in reapportionment cases.
Baker held the political question doctrine inapplicable to the federal
judiciary's relationship with the states.' 22 Moreover, the Court stated
that "judicially manageable standards" for enforcing the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment were "well developed and fa-
miliar."'" 3 Therefore, it directed the district court to hear the plaintiffs'
claims. 12
As in the desegregation cases, the Supreme Court was sensitive to
federalism concerns and to the practical difficulties involved in reappor-
tionment. The factors that had previously justified abstention were now
matters to be considered in tailoring appropriate remedies. In Reynolds
v. Sims," 5 decided two years after Baker v. Carr, the Court noted that
"[riemedial techniques in this new and developing area of law will
of the decision, litigation was underway in 22 states. Sindler, supra note 23, at 31.
Within six months, suits had been instituted in at least 31 states. Goldberg, supra note
22, at 96-97. Before the end of the year, more than 60 lawsuits had begun in at least 35
states. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Pro-
tection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 646 (1963).
120 See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-54 (1946). For citations of sub-
sequent cases reaffirming Colegrove, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 208 n.29 (1962).
12' As Justice Frankfurter explained in the majority opinion in Colegrove v. Green:
[T]his Court, from time to time, has refused to intervene in controversies.
It has refused to do so because due regard for the effective working of our
Government revealed this issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and
therefore not meet for judicial determination . . . . Nothing is clearer
than that this controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immedi-
ate and active relations with party contests. From the determination of
such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a demo-
cratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.
328 U.S. at 552-54 (1946).
Although the Court cast its refusal to intervene in terms of justiciability and political
questions, it abstained in the sense that federal courts were directed not to entertain
actions that were otherwise within their subject matter jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurter
explicitly labelled nonintervention in apportionment cases "abstention" in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Commentators likewise referred to
the Court's inaction as abstention. See, e.g., Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics
of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 83 (1962).
122 369 U.S. at 210.
123 Id. at 226.
124 Id. at 237.
'25 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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probably often differ with the circumstances of the challenged appor-
tionment and a variety of local conditions.""' 6 The Court suggested to
lower courts ways to implement relief that would entail minimal dis-
ruption of state elections.
1 2 7
In recent years the Supreme Court has relaxed apportionment stan-
dards. Apportionment plans with deviations from mathematical equal-
ity of less than ten percent no longer constitute the basis for a prima
facie case of invidious discrimination. 28 In addition, legitimate state in-
terests, such as maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, may
justify deviation from numerical equality. 29 The current Court has
not, however, returned to the view that reapportionment cases are
nonjusticiable.
3. Prisoners' Rights
Administration of state penal systems also was traditionally a matter
of exclusive state competence. Regulation of state prisons directly impli-
cates state laws, regulations, and procedures.130 The federal courts were
aware of the difficulties involved in judicially-imposed prison reform.13" '
Justice Powell reflected on these difficulties in Procunier v. Martinez:
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and
• . . they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all
of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to
deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and
reform. 13s
126 Id. at 585.
" See id. at 585-87.
128 See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 462 U.S. 835, 843 (1983); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 764 (1973).
129 See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2696 (1983); Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971). Other legislative policies justifying some variance include
"making districts compact, . . . preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding
contests between incumbent Representatives." Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740
(1983).
"* Preiser v. Rodriguez, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1973) ("It is difficult to imagine an
activity in which a state has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up
with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.").
See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
181 See Smolla, Prison Overcrowding and the Courts: A Roadmap for the 1980s,
1984 U. ILL. L.F. 389, 390.
12 416 U.S. at 404-05. Despite these difficulties, Procunier invalidated California
regulations restricting inmate correspondence and required minimum procedural safe-
guards before prison officials could censor or withhold a letter. Id. at 415-19. The
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Nonetheless, the federal courts have intervened.
As in reapportionment cases, the federal courts abruptly abandoned
an abstention doctrine to hear prisoner cases. During the 1940's and
1950's, lower federal courts routinely applied the so-called "hands-off"
doctrine to dismiss prisoner complaints. 33 Some courts held that they
lacked jurisdiction;"' others held that their hearing prison cases would
improperly interfere with the internal administration of state prisons."'
In 1964 Cooper v. Pate marked the end of this hands-off position by
holding that a prisoner complaint stated a cause of action cognizable in
federal court."' Federal intervention was limited at first to specific con-
stitutional deprivations, such as denial of the right to practice reli-
gion,1 3 7 to obtain reading materials,13 8 to have adequate legal materials
Court held that "When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitu-
tional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional
rights." Id. at 405-06.
133 Commentators have traced the origin of the hands-off doctrine to Ruffin v. Com-
monwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871). See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prison-
ers' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 178-79 (1970) ("[Tjhere have been few
... routes through which inmates could complain about their treatment . . .");
Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
985, 985 (1962). Ruffin held that
[a] convicted felon [is one] whom the law in its humanity punishes by
confinement in the penitentiary instead of with death . . . .For the time
being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in a state of
penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the
law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of
the State.
62 Va. at 795-96.
134 See, e.g., State v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1957).
' See, e.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 1954) ("This Court has
been hesitant to interfere with the administration of state penal institutions."); United
States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953)
("Inmates of State penitentiaries should realize that prison officials are vested with
wide discretion in safe-guarding prisoners committed to their custody. Discipline rea-
sonably maintained in State prisons is not under the supervisory direction of federal
courts."); Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Cal. 1959) ("Federal courts
have long been loath to interfere in the administration of State prisons . . . ."). For
extensive citation of cases applying the hands-off doctrine, see Comment, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Con-
victs, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508 n.12 (1963).
136 378 U.S. 546 (1964). Cooper filed a complaint challenging Warden Pate's re-
fusal to allow him to receive religious materials. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Id.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (right to receive
[Vol. 19:31
Younger Doctrine
to petition the courts,"' and to be free from harsh corporal punish-
ment.140 As federal judges confronted the shortcomings of American
prisons, however, they soon instigated comprehensive institutional re-
form touching on virtually all aspects of prison life. "1 Federal court
intervention in prison life to enforce constitutional rights has continued
unabated in recent years." 2
The hands-off doctrine sprang from federal courts' intention not to
interfere with the internal functioning of state penal institutions. With
the demise of the doctrine, courts acted on this concern by exercising
equitable discretion. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that incar-
ceration necessarily involves the curtailment of many rights.'43 Federal
courts therefore are to remedy only serious constitutional violations.'"
They are not to impose their own ideas about the best way to operate a
prison. 14  Prison officials have broad administrative authority over their
institutions," 6 particularly in implementing practices that are necessary
to preserve order, discipline, and institutional security.44 But when
ongoing federal supervision of a state prison system is required to vin-
dicate constitutional rights, a district court has "ample authority" to
black-oriented publications); Sostre v. Otis, 330 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (right to
receive and read books and periodicals); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (same); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(right to receive newsletter).
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S.
639 (1968).
14 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Talley v. Stephens,
247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
141 See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D.
Mass. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
142 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
143 Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3199 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
545 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
4' See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) ("Federal courts do not sit to super-
vise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prison-
ers."). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969) ("[Dliscipline and admin-
istration of state detention facilities . . . are subject to federal authority only where
paramount federal constitutional or statutory rights supervene.").
14 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539. Accord Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351
(1981).
140 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321
(1972).
107 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 473 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547);
see also Block v. Rutherford, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3232 (1984).
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proceed.' As Wolff v. McDonnell4 9 states, "there must be mutual
accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the pro-
visions of the Constitution that are of general application.' 5 0 Federal
court intervention achieved this accommodation.
4. Criminal Justice
Federal court intervention in desegregation, reapportionment, and
prisoners' rights suits stands in stark contrast to federal court inaction
in suits seeking systemic reform of state criminal justice systems. In the
first three areas, the courts have abandoned absiention and actively in-
tervened; in the criminal justice area, they have raised and strengthened
barriers to federal relief. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Rizzo
v. Goode 5 . and O'Shea v. Littleton, 5 ' the lower federal courts have
abstained in a wide range of cases alleging constitutional violations in
state criminal practices and procedures.'"
148 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) ("In fashioning a remedy, the
District Court had ample authority to go beyond earlier orders and to address each
element contributing to the violation . . . . [Tiaking the long and unhappy history of
the litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order to
insure against the risk of inadequate compliance.").
149 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
150 Id. at 556.
1l 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Rizzo held that abstention principles developed in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), forbade the district court from ordering the Philadelphia
Police Department to submit a plan to establish new procedures for receiving, investi-
gating, and adjudicating civilian complaints against the police. Id. at 380.
152 414 U.S. 488 (1974). O'Shea held that the Younger doctrine precluded a suit
against the Cairo, Illinois, Police Commissioner and two judges of the Alexander
County Circuit Court alleging that the defendants were intentionally engaged in a sys-
tematic and continuing program of racial discrimination in the administration of crimi-
nal justice. Id. at 499-504.
158 See, e.g., Dommer v. Crawford, 638 F.2d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1980) (abstention
in class action seeking injunction ordering state officials to comply with state law re-
quiring arraignment before magistrate within 24 hours of arrest), withdrawn and
amended opinion issued, 653 F.2d 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1981); Bonner v. Circuit Court,
526 F.2d 1331, 1335-38 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (abstention in suit by black state
criminal defendants alleging that judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers had joined in
a systematic, racially-motivated conspiracy to coerce guilty pleas), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 946 (1976); Wallace v. Kern (II), 499 F.2d 1345, 1351 (2d Cir. 1974) (abstention
in suit seeking time limits for commencement of state trials and requiring release of
defendants on recognizance for noncompliance), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975);
Leslie v. Matzkin, 450 F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1971) (abstention required in suit seek-
ing to compel Connecticut officals to provide indigent defendants with copies of prelim-
inary hearing transcripts in advance of trial), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). For
extensive citations to similar cases, see Zeigler, supra note 4, at 1039-41.
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This inconsistency in approach is perhaps most evident in the con-
trast between cases forbidding federal court review of state police or
judicial procedures and cases approving federal court review of similar
procedures in prisons and jails. Police departments, courts, and correc-
tions departments are all parts of state criminal justice systems. The
federal courts have never explained why the former two components of
these systems should be immune from direct federal court scrutiny
while the corrections component is subject to massive federal court in-
tervention. Why, for example, should federal courts abstain in cases
seeking injunctive relief against systematic police brutality or the mis-
treatment of persons in police custody,' 54 while entertaining identical
actions against corrections officials?"'5 It is irrational to bar prisoners
in police custody from seeking relief when the same prisoners can seek
relief the instant they are turned over to the corrections department and
become pretrial detainees. Similarly, why should federal courts abstain
in cases alleging denial of minimum procedural safeguards in state ju-
dicial proceedings while entertaining cases making similar complaints
about prison disciplinary proceedings? The anomalous result of this di-
chotomy is that persons charged with crimes may not seek federal court
review, for example, of systemic procedural unfairness in the adminis-
tration of the money bail system."' However, when they are sent from
criminal court to a detention facility, they can ask a federal court to
impose procedural safeguards before they are placed in administrative
segregation or made to suffer other grievous loss.'
57
15 For examples of federal court abstention in such cases, see Los Angeles v. Lyons,
457 U.S. 1115 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Robinson v. Stovall, 473
F. Supp. 135, 143-47 (N.D. Miss. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part, 646 F.2d
1087 (5th Cir. 1981).
'5' For examples of cases entertaining such claims, see Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d
34, 36 (2d Cir. 1983); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 628 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 507
F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F. Supp. 1152, 1165 (D. Md.
1973).
15 For examples of federal court abstention in cases raising such claims, see Tarter
v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (abstention in suit by defendants in state
criminal proceedings claiming imposition of excessive bail); Wallace v. Kern (III), 520
F.2d 400, 405-08 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976) (abstention in suit
challenging bail practices in the courts of Brooklyn, New York); Rivera v. Freeman,
469 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 1972) (abstention in case challenging California statute
governing detention of juveniles).
M For examples of cases entertaining such claims, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460 (1983) (restricting Wo/ff safeguards, but nonetheless hearing the case on the mer-
its); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-74 (1974) (setting minimum procedural
requirements in prison disciplinary proceedings). See also Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm,
406 F. Supp. 836, 848-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (setting minimum safeguards); Berch v.
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Section I has demonstrated that state criminal justice systems exhibit
many of the characteristics that made federal court intervention in other
state institutions appropriate and necessary and that abstention in crim-
inal justice cases is inconsistent with intervention in desegregation, re-
apportionment, and prisoners' rights suits. It might be contended that
special principles of comity between federal and state judges serve to
explain and justify the divergent approaches. The next section ad-
dresses this hypothesis and shows that state courts do not require
greater deference by federal judges than the other branches of state
government.
II. THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF HEIGHTENED DEFERENCE FOR
STATE COURTS
Desegregation, reapportionment, and prisoners' rights cases usually
are directed against executive or legislative officials, while criminal jus-
tice reform cases very often are directed at judges. By abstaining in
criminal justice cases and intervening in the other areas, federal courts
accord a special deference to state judges that does not extend to other
state officials."' 8 Federal courts leave state judges free to hear their
cases and administer their affairs without direct federal court scrutiny,
while subjecting legislative and executive officials to direct supervision
and review.
1 59
Neither history nor logic support heightened deference for state
courts in actions alleging systemic violation of federal constitutional
rights. Most federal actions seeking reform of state criminal justice sys-
tems rely upon the fourteenth amendment, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and
28 U.S.C. section 1343(3).1 60 The legislative history of these Recon-
struction Era measures clearly shows that Congress intended to accom-
plish a systemic reform of southern justice systems, including the
courts. In addition, there is no logical reason why the federal courts
should grant the judicial branch of state government a greater respect
than they accord the other branches. Principles of federalism and com-
Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412, 422 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (same); Inmates of Milwaukee County
Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1166-67 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (same).
I" Younger abstention is most often invoked in cases in which the plaintiff seeks to
interfere, directly or indirectly, with the operation of state courts. See, e.g., Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415; Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488;
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37. But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (abstention
doctrine bars interference with executive agency).
150 See supra Section I.
180 See Zeigler, supra note 4, at 1022-36, 1039-41.
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ity entitle each branch of state government to the same deference and
respect. Finally, federal judges' expertise in judicial administration
makes them particularly well qualified to assist in reforming the state
courts.
A. The Special Deference Accorded to State Courts
The special deference accorded to state courts in Younger abstention
cases is based on several rationales. Traditional considerations of com-
ity dictate that a court not attempt to wrest a case from another judicial
system that has assumed jurisdiction.16 Federalism principles augment
comity concerns. As the Younger Court stated, federalism requires
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a con-
tinuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate func-
tions in their separate ways." 2
According to this view, the federal courts should respect a state's inter-
est "in not having its judicial process grind to a halt while the federal
courts decide constitutional questions..."63
Special deference to state courts also reflects a desire to avoid dupli-
cative proceedings."" If two court systems hear the same case at the
same time, confusion and inefficiency may result. In addition, interven-
tion in pending state proceedings reflects negatively upon a state court's
ability to enforce constitutional rights. 65 State courts, like federal
161 See Chittenden v. Brewster, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 191 (1864); Peck v. Jenness, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624-25 (1849); Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836);
M'kim v. Voorhies, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 279 (1812); Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 179 (1807); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on
Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 45
(1974); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REV. 345, 349
(1930). See generally Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS
L.J. 103, 113-18 (1981).
... Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44. See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 441 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 334-35; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 601 (1975).
M Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 472 (1978). See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. at 335 ("A State's
interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its
judicial system . . . [is] surely an important interest.").
16 Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 445; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462
(1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
166 Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. at 446; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at
603; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 462.
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courts, "have the solemn responsibility . . . 'to guard, enforce, and pro-
tect every right granted or secured by the Constitution.' 166
B. The Legislative History of Reconstruction
These rationales for according a special deference to state courts find
little support in the legislative history of Reconstruction. The legislative
debates of that era manifest a pervasive distrust of southern state
courts, and Congress repeatedly directed the federal courts to intervene
in state judicial proceedings when necessary to protect paramount fed-
eral rights.
Following the end of the Civil War, newly elected southern legisla-
tors enacted comprehensive laws effectively reenslaving the freedmen.""
The framers of these "Black Codes" envisioned that the southern crimi-
nal justice system would be the primary enforcement mechanism, and
the Codes contained harsh criminal sanctions. 6 The Thirty-Ninth
Congress was greatly upset by the Codes and by the maladministration
of southern justice.1 The removal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866170 sought to interfere with enforcement of the Codes in southern
state courts. The Act authorized the federal courts to divest the state
courts of jurisdiction in all cases in which the defendant was unable to
enforce any of the broad range of civil rights secured by the Act.'
Other legislation addressed procedural impediments to removal imposed
by the state courts and eased the way for removal of thousands of cases
from state to federal court.1
72
16 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 460-61 (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624, 637 (1884)). See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) (The
"lawfulness or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is
based may be determined as readily in the [state] criminal case as in a suit for an
injunction.").
167 For a compilation of these laws, see Howard, Laws in Relation to Freedmen, S.
EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 170-230 (1867). See generally D. NOVAK,
THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE: BLACK FORCED LABOR AFTER SLAVERY (1978); T.
WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965).
16 See Zeigler, supra note 4, at 994.
169 See generally id. at 995-1007; Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Fed-
erally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
To Abort State Court Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 809-25 (1965).
170 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
171 Id. § 3.
172 See, e.g., ACT OF MAY 11, 1866, ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46 (1866) (clarified and ex-
panded the provisions of the 1863 Habeas Corpus and Removal Act); THE SEPARABLE
CONTROVERSIES ACT, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866) (allowed a nonresident defendant to
remove his portion of a case to federal court, leaving claims against nondiverse, resident
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The Thirty-Ninth Congress also passed the fourteenth amend-
ment 173 to correct problems caused by the Black Codes and the malad-
ministration of southern justice.174 The legislators believed that section
1 of the amendment' 7  would abolish the Black Codes1'7 and enable
Congress to pass legislation requiring states to administer justice
fairly. 
77
The Civil Rights Act of 1871178 was enacted under the enforcement
power of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment' 79 in response to Ku
Klux Klan violence and the continued systemic breakdown in the ad-
ministration of justice in the South. 8 During the debates on the mea-
sure, legislators complained about virtually all components of the
southern justice system,' 81 including the courts.' 2 The debates on sec-
defendant for adjudication in state court). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 169, at
820-25; Zeigler, supra note 4, at 1002-04, 1007 n.137.
17s CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866).
174 See Zeigler, supra note 4, at 1004-06.
17 Section 1 reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17s See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (remarks of Rep. Bingham), 2459
(Rep. Stevens), 2766 (Sen. Howard), 2961 (Sen. Poland), 3034 (Sen. Henderson)
(1866).
177 See id. at 1064, 1090, 1094 (remarks of Rep. Bingham), 2961 (Sen. Poland),
2082-83 (Rep. Perham), 2510-11 (Rep. Miller). Many members of Congress believed
that § 1 would "incorporate the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the
organic law of the land." Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948). See, e.g., CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (remarks of Rep. Thayer), 2498 (Rep. Broomall),
2283 (Rep. Latham) (1866).
178 Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
179 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Legislators specifically viewed the
first and fifth sections of the fourteenth amendment as conferring power to enforce
federal rights against misconduct by state officials. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 332 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Stoughton), app. 83 (Rep. Bingham), 375 (Rep.
Lowe), 504-06 (Sen. Pratt), 608-09 (Sen. Pool), app. 256 (Sen. Wilson).
1s0 Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 171-80 (1961). See generally Zeigler, supra note 4, at 1011-20.
"8 For complaints about southern sheriffs, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
app. 78 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Perry), 334 (Rep. Hoar), 459 (Rep. Coburn), app.
185 (Rep. Platt). Specific complaints of juror misconduct can be found in id. at 155,
1985]
University of California, Davis
tion I of the Act '83 make clear that the remedies prescribed therein
should be used to redress state court denial of federal rights.1"4 In addi-
157-58, 201, 334, 429, 458, 481, 487, and 502. Witnesses were criticized as well. See,
e.g., id. at 201, 437, 458, 481, 502, 571, and 653.
18' See, e.g., id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey) (The "courts are in many instances
under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of
law and equity."), app. 185 (Rep. Platt) ("[N]o Republican, white or black, especially
if he is a citizen who has come here from another State or is at all prominent, can
secure as plaintiff or defendant anything like equal justice before the courts of [Vir-
ginia]."); see also id. at 201 (Sen. Nye), 321 (Rep. Stoughton), 482 (Rep. Wilson), 487
(Rep. Lansing), 653 (Sen. Osborn), app. 78 (Rep. Perry), app. 251 (Sen. Morton), 429
(Rep. Beatty).
183 The provisions of § 1 as presently codified read in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or of the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person: . .. 3)To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982).
I"8 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Fre-
linghuysen). During the hearings, Senator Frelinghuysen stated:
As to . . .civil remedies, for a violation of [constitutional guarantees], we
know that when the courts of a State violate the provisions of the Consti-
tution or law of the United States there is now relief afforded by a review
in the Federal courts. And since the fourteenth amendment forbids any
State from making or enforcing any law abridging these privileges and
immunities . . . the injured party should have an original action in our
Federal courts, so that by injunction or by the recovery of damages he
could have relief against the party who under color of. . .law is guilty of
infringing his rights. As to the civil remedy no one, I think, can object.
Id.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that proponents of § 1 intended it to apply
to state courts. See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1980 (1984) ("[N]othing in the
legislative history of § 1983 or in this Court's subsequent interpretations of that statute
supports a conclusion that Congress intended to insulate judges from prospective collat-
eral injunctive relief."). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (Propo-
nents thought the legislation necessary because "state courts were being used to harass
and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop depriva-
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tion, the legislators did not want the federal courts to abstain if com-
plainants could seek relief in the state courts because the state courts
routinely failed to enforce federal rights."8 5 Instead, section 1 of the Act
authorized "the assertion of immediate jurisdiction through [the federal
courts], without the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is
domiciled" 1 6 to protect fundamental rights.1
87
The legislative history of Reconstruction thus does not support the
position that federal courts owe a greater deference to state judges than
to state legislative or executive officials. Instead, Congress intended that
the federal courts intervene when necessary to restrain unconstitutional
action by any branch of state government. The principles of federalism
and comity cited as supporting a special deference to state courts 88
must be read in light of the legislative history and modified accordingly.
History plainly teaches that no branch of state government is entitled to
the blind deference accorded state courts by Younger v. Harris and its
progeny.
tions or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally pro-
tected rights.").
1I" See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 252 (1871) (remarks of Sen.
Morton) ("But it is said . . . the matter should be left with the States. The answer to
that is, that . . . the States do not protect the rights of the people; the State courts are
powerless to redress these wrongs. The great fact remains that large classes of people
. . . are without legal remedy in the courts of the States."); see also id. at 201 (Sen.
Nye), 505 (Sen. Pratt), app. 262 (Rep. Dunnell), 394 (Rep. Rainey), 346 (Sen. Sher-
man), app. 271 (Rep. Havens), app. 311 (Rep. Maynard), app. 183 (Rep. Platt).
Ise Id. at 389 (remarks of Rep. Elliott); see also id. at 692 (Sen. Edmunds). Many
legislators expressed their belief that the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment
reach broadly to all branches of state government. See, e.g., id. at 482 (remarks of Rep.
Wilson) ("Obviously the word [State] is used in its largest and most comprehensive
sense. It means the government of the State . . . . [A] State . . . is a trinity: the legis-
lative, the judicial, and the executive; these three are one, the State."); see also id. at
506 (remarks of Sen. Pratt), app. 182 (Rep. Mercur), 607-08 (Sen. Pool), app. 315
(Rep. Burchard), 696 (Sen. Edmunds).
187 In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Supreme Court relied on the
legislative history of § I in determining that the equitable relief authorized there came
within the "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Court summed up the history as follows:
This legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived
that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation
with respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned
that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that
state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those
rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
188 See supra Section II A.
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C. The Illogic of Granting State Courts Special Deference
No logical reason supports federal courts according greater deference
to state courts than to other branches of state government in cases in-
volving vindication of fundamental rights. The principles of federalism
and comity cited in the Younger abstention cases to justify special treat-
ment for state courts could as reasonably be offered to support absten-
tion in cases seeking intervention in state legislative or executive affairs.
But the federal courts do not abstain in such cases. Instead, courts treat
principles of federalism and comity as factors to weigh in the wise exer-
cise of equitable discretion in fashioning appropriate relief." 9 It would
be much more reasonable to apply these principles similarly in cases
seeking to correct constitutional abuses in state courts.
Federalism requires that all state institutions be "left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways"' 90 so long as they do
not violate the federal Constitution. But federal court interference with
the state judiciary imposes no greater strain on federal-state relations
than does interference with the other branches. 9' Intervention in state
school systems, legislatures, and prisons to enforce constitutional safe-
guards often substantially modifies those institutions. A state has an
interest in not having any of its institutions "grind to a halt while the
federal courts decide constitutional questions."' 92
Special deference to state courts is based in part on the desire to
avoid the confusion and inefficiency of duplicative proceedings. 9 ' But
these practical problems are not intrinsically more complex than those
that arise from intervention in legislative and executive affairs. Orders
directing legislative reapportionment, school desegregation, and prison
reform often cause delay and confusion as federal judges and local offi-
cials grapple with change, and sometimes act at cross-purposes. In ad-
dition, such orders reflect every bit as negatively upon the ability of
state legislative and executive officials to enforce constitutional rights as
similar orders directed at state judges would reflect upon their ability to
enforce constitutional rights. State executive and legislative officials
have the same responsibility as state judges to enforce and protect fed-
so See supra Section I B 1-3. But see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
191 See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1984) ("The intrusion into the state
process would result whether the action enjoined were that of a state judge or of an-
other state official.").
'92 See Redish, supra note 163, at 472.




One danger in arguing for parity of treatment by the federal courts
for all branches of state government is that consistency could also be
achieved by abstention in cases aimed at state executive or legislative
misconduct. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has suggested this ap-
proach. In Rizzo v. Goode,"9 ' the Court relied upon the Younger doc-
trine in reversing a lower court order requiring Philadelphia officials to
submit a plan for receiving, investigating, and adjudicating civilian
complaints against the police. The Court held:
[Tihe principles of federalism which play such an important part in gov-
erning the relationship between federal courts and state governments...
likewise have applicablility where injunctive relief is sought, not against
the judicial branch of the state government, but against those in charge of
an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments such as
petitioners here. 1"
' The United States Constitution commands that "[t]he Senators and Representa-
tives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all exec-
utive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution .... ." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 3. For examples of state constitutions with similar provisions, see CAL. CONST.
art. 20 § 3 (requiring officials of all branches of state government to take an oath to
uphold the United States Constitution); MICH. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (same); N.Y.
CONST. art. 13, § I (same). See Montgomery v. State, 55 Fla. 97, 99, 45 So. 879, 881
(1908) ("The Constitution of the United States, within its limited sphere, is the su-
preme law of the land; and it is the duty of all officials, whether legislative, judicial,
executive, administrative, or ministerial, to so perform every official act as not to violate
the constitutional provisions."). See also Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175
(5th Cir. 1956) ("[AII executive officers of the several states are bound by oath or
affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States.").
195 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
10 Id. at 380. See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983). Rizzo
alarmed commentators and the public interest bar. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Yeazell, The
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465,
504-05 (1980) (attempting to distinguish Rizzo from the mainstream of institutional
reform litigation); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1154-60 (1977) (suggesting
that Rizzo reveals a desire to insulate the status quo from judicial interference); Gib-
bons, supra note 99, at 1109 (contending that Rizzo and other abstention cases may
portend "a drastic curtailment of the federal injunctive remedy against state violations
of individual civil rights"); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV.
1191, 1194-95 (1977) (accusing Supreme Court of fashioning a "crude weapon" in
Rizzo v. Goode, and "one capable of an unacceptable degree of destruction"); Zeigler,
supra note 4, at 1031-36 (arguing that abstention in Rizzo is wholly inappropriate in
light of the legislative history of Reconstruction). Shortly after Rizzo was decided, a
coalition of civil liberties and public interest law groups addressed a letter of protest to
the lawyers and judges attending a national conference on law reform entitled "The
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
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Although Rizzo is correct in its conclusion that courts should defer
equally to the executive and judicial branches of state government, the
Court was wrong to abstain.197 Courts should instead achieve parity of
of Justice." N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1976, at 11, col. 3. The letter charged that "Rizzo v.
Goode ...galvanized our view that the Supreme Court is embarked on a dangerous
and destructive journey designed to dilute the power of the federal judiciary to serve as
guardian of federal constitutional rights." Letter from Arych Neier, et al., to partici-
pants in the "Pound Revisited" Conference, Apr. 7, 1976, at 2. Alarm over Rizzo
plainly is justified, for if carried to its logical conclusion, it could result in the de facto
repeal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) by imposing a ban on all federal
suits brought against state officials for violation of federal constitutional rights. Redish,
supra note 163, at 471; Weinberg, supra, at 1195; Zeigler, supra note 1, at 291-92
n.111.
'9 In response to Rizzo, some commentators attempted to distinguish federal court
intervention in state judicial proceedings from intervention in the workings of the other
branches to provide a basis for limiting abstention to suits affecting judicial proceedings.
Such attempts are well-motivated but do not withstand close analysis. The more per-
suasive argument is that abstention is unjustified in suits against any branch of state
government.
Robert D. Goldstein asserts that there are "differing relationships between a federal
court and state court, state legislature, and state executive." Goldstein, A Swann Song
for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I,
19 (1978). In his view, greater deference to state courts is warranted because they have
"the same duty and presumably the same competence as a federal court; moreover, an
appeal to the Supreme Court and federal habeas corpus in a criminal case permit a
check on state court competence." Id. Thus, Mr. Goldstein concludes that abstention in
§ 1983 cases against state judges merely alters "the timing of review," while abstention
in cases against state executive officials "shields the state executive from an effective
remedy." Id.
Mr. Goldstein makes several faulty assumptions. First, he implies that courts,
whether state or federal, have a greater duty to observe federal constitutional require-
ments than do other governmental officials. This is simply incorrect. See supra note
194. Second, he presumes that state courts are as able as federal courts to entertain
challenges to state judicial practices and procedures. This presumption is unwarranted,
however, because state courts are both unwilling and unable to put their own houses in
order. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. Finally, Mr. Goldstein assumes
that direct Supreme Court review and federal habeas corpus are effective devices to
monitor state court performance. Although these devices can sometimes correct injustice
in an individual case, inherent limitations restrict their utility in achieving systemic
reform in the day-to-day workings of the lower criminal courts. See infra Section III.
Thus, abstention in cases challenging state judicial behavior does not merely delay re-
view of most federal claims. Rather, it shields state judicial action from effective federal
review just as abstention in cases against executive or legislative officials would shield
their actions from review.
Louise Weinberg also attempts to distinguish suits against the judicial branch of state
government from suits against other branches, although in somewhat different terms
than Mr. Goldstein. Weinberg, supra note 196, at 1224-27. Professor Weinberg points
to two differences between "proceedings" cases directed against judicial proceedings and
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treatment by abandoning the abstention doctrine in suits directed
against state judicial proceedings and following the approach taken in
desegregation, reapportionment, and prisoners' rights suits.
D. Federal Court Expertise in Judicial Reform
Federal judges often cite their lack of expertise as a reason for cau-
tion and restraint when intervening in state institutions. 9 They can-
"officials" cases directed against state executive officials that might justify abstention in
the former cases while allowing federal courts to act in the latter cases. First, she as-
serts that in proceedings cases, the state court presumably is competent to hear the
federal plaintiff's constitutional defenses, while in officials cases, "by hypothesis there is
no particular forum, only some vague possibility of state remedies." Id. at 1224. Sec-
ond, she asserts that officials cases "in the task of formulation and administration of
remedies . . . present problems and opportunities wholly absent from 'proceedings'
cases." Id. at 1225. Thus, in an officials case like Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, the
trial court was able to structure relatively unobtrusive relief that accorded proper defer-
ence to state concerns. Weinberg, supra note 196, at 1224-27. In a proceedings case
such as Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, granting relief would enjoin a state prosecu-
tion and thus cause a correspondingly greater intrusion into state affairs.
Professor Weinberg's analysis may provide colorable grounds for distinguishing
Rizzo v. Goode and Younger v. Harris on their facts. When her distinctions between
proceedings and officials cases are viewed in a broader context, however, they quickly
lose their vitality. Preliminarily, the distinction between proceedings and officials cases
is itself somewhat artificial. Suits directed at state judicial proceedings also are directed
at the state official who is conducting the proceedings. Other state officials such as
prosecutors and police who are participating in the proceedings may also be affected.
Conversely, suits directed at state executive officials typically concern their practices
and procedures - in short, their proceedings. In addition, as noted above, state judges
in most instances will not enforce federal constitutional rights any more vigorously than
state executive or legislative officials. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
Finally, many suits challenging state judicial practices do not seek to enjoin pending
criminal cases. Rather, they seek prospective injunctive relief making the practices con-
form to constitutional requirements. Relief can be tailored narrowly to redress only the
specific constitutional violation involved. Thus, proceedings cases often present essen-
tially the same "problems and opportunities" in the "formulation and administration of
remedies," Weinberg, supra note 196, at 1225, as officials cases.
Professors Eisenberg and Yeazell also attempt to limit Younger's scope by distin-
guishing between cases interfering with state judicial proceedings and suits directed
against state institutions. They assert that "federal actions contemporaneous with pend-
ing or threatened state proceedings are considered to interfere to a much greater degree
with state functions ...than are federal suits in the absence of such proceedings."
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 196, at 503. Suits reforming state institutions, how-
ever, can cause just as much interference with state functions as suits affecting state
proceedings. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 855 (5th
Cir. 1966) ("[M]ost judges do not have sufficient competence - they are not educators
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not, however, claim lack of expertise in cases seeking systemic reform of
state criminal justice systems. Over the past twenty years, federal courts
have struggled with and solved many of the same problems that plague
state courts. Federal judges have gained substantial expertise in court
administration; they are uniquely qualified to assist their state counter-
parts in reform.
Federal court caseloads have increased dramatically in the last
twenty-five years at both the trial 99 and appellate levels.200 In re-
sponse, the federal judiciary has struggled to keep its dockets reasona-
or school administrators - to know the right questions, must [sic] less the right an-
swers."); Milliken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974) (same); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (Solving the problems of prisons "require[s]
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment."); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
978 (1972) (same); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (Federal judges in reapportionment cases "do not have accepted legal standards or
criteria or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial judgments. To
charge courts with the task of accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy
that underlie these mathematical puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicom-
petence to judges."). See also Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Call for Explora-
tion, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 990 (1979) ("[I1t is quite a different enterprise to send a
solitary trial judge to hear a choir of experts, review voluminous data, step into the
shoes of a social planner and public executive, and devise a long-range, multifaceted
public impact program without any guidance or support from an organization."). But
see Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791,
822-23 (1976) (suggesting that lawyers have always been regarded as jacks-of-all
trades, and that reapportioning legislatures or desegregating schools is "hardly more
foreign to the general run of judicial duties than restructuring businesses under the
antitrust laws . . ").
'" Civil case filings in United States district courts increased from 59,284 in 1960 to
241,842 in 1983. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE WORKLOAD OF THE FEDERAL COURTS FOR THE TWELVE MONTH
PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1983, at 114 (1983). Criminal filings increased more mod-
estly, from 28,137 in 1960 to 34,681 in 1983. Id. at 160. The number of judges in-
creased during this period, but not in proportion to the increased caseload. Id. at 119.
Total annual new filings per judge increased from 357 in 1960 to 537 in 1983. Id. at
114, 119, 160.
,00 Appeals filed increased from 3,899 in 1960 to 29,630 in 1983. Id. at 97. The
number of Court of Appeals judges grew from 68 to 132 during this period. Id. Conse-
quently, annual new filings per judge increased from 57 in 1960 to 224 in 1983. For
discussions of the growing caseloads in the federal courts, see generally W.
McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS (1984); Clark, A Commentary on Con-
gestion in the Federal Court, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407 (1976); Lasker, The Court
Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245 (1978).
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bly current and to prevent the erosion of constitutional safeguards. 01
Federal judges were instrumental in bringing about legislative reform
of the federal criminal process'0" and played a substantial role in plan-
ning and implementing reforms.20 s
After many years of lobbying by the Judicial Conference' 04 and
others, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.05 to provide
for assignment of counsel to all defendants who could not afford to re-
tain counsel in federal criminal cases.206 Senator Hruska, one of the
sponsors of the measure, explained its purpose as follows:
[W]e are a nation dedicated to the precept of equal justice for all. Experi-
ence has abundantly demonstrated that, if this rule of law will hold out
more than an illusion of justice for the indigent, we must have the means
to insure adequate representation that the bill before us provides. 0 '
Congress gave primary responsibility for implementation of the Act to
the federal courts.2"' A subsequent study of the Act's administration
'0' Chief Justice Burger has explained the link between efficient court operation and
justice as follows: "Why are we concerned about productivity? A more productive judi-
cial system is essential for justice . . . giving litigants their relief promptly, rather than
forcing them to wait endlessly while memories grow dim and witnesses move or die.
. . ." Press Release by Warren E. Burger, Thirty Percent Increase in Case Handling
per Federal Judgeship (Oct. 1973), quoted in Tamm & Reardon, Warren E. Burger
and the Administration of Justice, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 447, 454.
20' See infra notes 204-41 and accompanying text.
208 Kerwin, Judicial Implementation of Public Policy: The Courts and Legislation
for the Judiciary, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 415-17 (1979); Remington, Circuit
Council Reform, A Boat Hook for Judges and Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 695, 720.
204 The Judicial Conference consists of the Chief Justice of the United States, the
chief judge of each judicial circuit, one district judge from each circuit, and two bank-
ruptcy judges. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). The Conference often plays a major role in
formulating and implementing legislation affecting the federal courts. Kerwin, supra
note 203, at 418-19.
20' Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 2, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
3006(a) (1982)).
200 Id. Prior to the Act, representation of the poor in federal court was haphazard
and of uneven quality. See generally Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal
Defendants in the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579 (1963). See also
Kerwin, supra note 203, at 427-28; Kutak, The CriminalJustice Act of 1964, 44 NEB.
L. REV. 703, 704-06 (1965). The Judicial Conference urged enactment of a public
defender system in busy federal districts as early as 1937. Report of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, 8-9 (Sept. Sess. 1937). Legislative efforts to create such a
system in the 1940's and 1950's are reviewed in Kutak, supra, at 711-14. For a de-
tailed account of the 1964 Act's passage by Congress, see id. at 717-25.
'07 110 CONG. REG. 18,521 (1964).
2-8 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1982) reads: "Each United States district court, with the
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found that "[tihe judiciary moved with dispatch in promulgating plans
for furnishing representation," and that "[i]ndividual district judges,
[who bear] most of the administrative responsibility, have been gener-
ally conscientious in carrying out the letter and spirit of the Act."'20 9
The federal judiciary also was instrumental in devising and imple-
menting the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968."'0 In 1966, Chief
Justice Warren reactivated the Judicial Conference Committee on the
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the
district a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain
adequate representation . . . ." Subsection (a) also lists alternatives that individual dis-
tricts might choose. These provisions recognized "the wide variety of conditions and
requirements existing among the federal district courts," Kutak, supra note 206, at
727, and contemplated that the federal courts would use their discretion to construct a
plan that best suited their individual needs.
'" Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts - A Summary
and Postscript, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 210, 210-11 (1969). The study also found that
"[d]ifficulties of . : . administration, to be expected in initial operation under such
novel legislation, have been minimized by . . . the careful supervision and administra-
tive guidance of the Judicial Conference Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice
Act." Id. The implementation process is described in Kerwin, supra note 203, at 427-
30. The Act was amended in 1970 to expand the categories of eligible defendants, to
increase rates of compensation, and to allow each district to establish a public defender
organization to carry out the purposes of the Act. Criminal Justice Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447, § 1, 84 Stat. 916 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (1968)).
See Kerwin, supra note 203, at 430.
10 Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 53 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69
(1982)). Prior to passage of the Act, the juror selection process was "governed by . . .
the vagaries of local custom and practice," S. Rep. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1967), and lacked adequate judicial supervision. Id. See also Kaufman, The Judges
and Jurors: Recent Developments in Selection of Jurors and Fair Trial - Free
Press, 41 U. CoLo. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (1969). In addition, selection procedures
generally were not designed to place a representative cross-section of the community on
the jury rolls. Id. at 180. For example, many districts used a "key-man" selection sys-
tem. Designated local citizens supplied jury commissioners with names of persons suita-
ble for jury service. Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Impartial Jury, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1137, 1141-43 (1978); Gewin, The Jury Se-
lection and Service Act of 1968: Implementation in the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 20 MERcER L. REV. 349, 354-55 (1969). The key-man system resulted in un-
derrepresentation of lower socio-economic groups, minorities, and the young. See Imlay,
Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 247,
250 (1973) ("The 'Main Street town booster,' a middle-aged male in the middle in-
come bracket, remained the prototype of our federal juror."); Mills, A Statistical Study
of Occupations of Jurors in a United States District Court, 22 MD. L. REV. 205, 212
(1962); Note, Underrepresentation of Economic Groups on Federal Juries, 57 B.U.L.
REV. 198, 200 (1977). For brief historical reviews of federal jury selection procedures,
see Gewin, supra, at 351-56; Stanley, Federal Jury Selection and Service Before and
After 1968, 66 F.R.D. 375, 375-80 (1975).
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Operation of the Jury System.'1 1 The Committee studied the jury sys-
tem's problems and issued a report2 1'" that served as a basis for the
1968 Act. 213 The Act declared as federal policy "that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity ... "214 It prohibited exclusion from jury service "on account of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."'1 5 To
achieve these objectives, the legislature instructed each federal district
court to devise a written plan for juror qualification and selection" 6 in
accordance with general statutory guidelines.' 1 7 The federal courts im-
plemented the new procedures in due course,"' and gave the jury sys-
tem new life as an effective instrument of democracy.'
The federal courts also played a major role in implementing the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974.220 Under the Act, each district court was "to
conduct a continuing study of the administration of criminal justice in
,11 Imlay, supra note 210, at 252; Kaufman, supra note 210, at 181.
'12 See Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Jury System of The Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, 42 F.R.D. 353 (1967).
11 Kaufman, supra note 210, at 181-82; Kerwin, supra note 203, at 423.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976).
2-5 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976).
2-6 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1976). The Committee on the Operation of the Jury Sys-
tem, see supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text, had two reasons for suggesting the
plan requirement. First, it "permitted] some local flexibility within a nationally uni-
form scheme." Kaufman, supra note 210, at 184. Second, "the existence of a formal
written plan would go far toward dispelling the vagueness, confusion, and ignorance
that have often cloaked jury selection." Id. at 185. The Act also required that the
judicial council of the circuit approve the plan. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (1976).
117 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863-68 (1976). For a detailed review of the Act's provisions,
see Ashby, supra note 210, at 1143-46; Gewin, supra note 210, at 357-62; Imlay,
supra note 210, at 252-56.
' The implementation process in the Fifth Circuit is described in Gewin, supra
note 210, at 362-85.
219 Imlay, supra note 210, at 262. Mr. Imlay, General Counsel to the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, cautioned, however, that some problems re-
mained. See id. at 263-73. Commentators have criticized federal court reluctance to
recognize additional cognizable groups entitled to protection under the Act's broad an-
tidiscrimination language. See, e.g., Ashby, supra note 210, at 1147-49; Zeigler, Young
Adults as a Cognizable Group injury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1060-61,
1066-67 (1978); Note, Economic Groups, supra note 210.
2"' Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-
74 (1982)). Congress passed the Act to clarify the rights of criminal defendants and to
protect the public interest in swift adjudication of criminal cases. Frase, The Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 667, 669 (1976); Kerwin, supra note 203, at
425.
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the district court and . . . prepare plans for the disposition of criminal
cases in accordance with this chapter.""2 " Each plan was to include "a
description of the time limits, procedural techniques, innovations, sys-
tems and other methods" by which the district court was to expedite
criminal cases.2"2 The courts also were to devise reliable procedures to
monitor compliance,228 and to specify rule changes, amendments, and
appropriations necessary to accomplish the goals of the legislation. 2
The federal courts had many problems implementing the Speedy
Trial Act because the reform program was complex and affected virtu-
ally all aspects of their criminal docket. Problems arose in defining the
time limits for processing cases and the permissible sanctions for non-
compliance."" The Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and the Federal Judicial Center, both of which sought to promote na-
tional uniformity, were at odds with individual district courts, which
tended to interpret the Act in their own way,226 or in some cases, to
ignore it."21 In addition, lack of adequate resources hindered the work
of the planning groups.2"' Implementation of the Act's permanent time
limits was delayed until 1979 to enable the courts to complete the re-
search and planning."' Nonetheless, there is evidence of substantial
progress in complying with the provisions of the Act.230 Many districts
21 18 U.S.C. § 3165(a)(1982).
22 18 U.S.C. § 3166(a)(1982).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 3166(b)-(c), 3170 (1982).
18 U.S.C. § 3166(d) (1982).
22 See Frase, supra note 220, at 676-720; Kerwin, supra note 203, at 437-38.
2" Mann, The Speedy Trial Planning Process, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 54, 67-69
(1980).
2" See, e.g., Misner, District Court Compliance With the Speedy Trial Act of 1974:
The Ninth Circuit Experience, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 25. ("The cold fact facing the
Ninth Circuit is that compliance with the reporting requirements of the Speedy Trial
Act has been minimal in many districts.").
* Mann, supra note 226, at 69-71.
22- 18 U.S.C. § 3161(O-(g) (1982). For summaries of the provisions of the Act, see
Frase, supra note 220, at 670-73; Misner, supra note 227, at 2-7. The Speedy Trial
Act was amended in 1979 to simplify some of the procedures and to postpone use of the
dismissal sanction until July 1, 1980. Speedy Trial Act Amendments Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-43, 93 Stat. 327 (1979). For extensive analysis of the amended act, see R.
MISNER, SPEEDY TRIAL FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE 215-328 (1983).
29' See Project, The Speedy Trial Act: An Empirical Study, 47 FORDHAM L. REV.
13, 716, 765 (1979) ("[The Act has found greater acceptance and created fewer diffi-
culties than many of its opponents presume. . . . Enforcement of the. . .Act in the
districts of Eastern New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, although not free from
difficulty, has largely proven successful."); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, supra note 199, at 179-80 (reporting 97% compliance with the Act).
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changed pretrial procedures and reordered case processing require-
ments."'1 The federal courts thus have gained valuable experience in
implementing complex administrative reform.
In addition to measures designed to vindicate specific constitutional
rights, the judiciary has played an active role in improving the general
efficiency, productivity, and fairness of the federal courts. The Federal
Magistrates Act of 19682' created the magistrate, a new judicial officer
who would assist district judges.2" The Judicial Conference has re-
sponsibility for overseeing the magistrate system,28 and individual dis-
trict courts and judges have discretion in deciding which matters to
delegate to magistrates.2 85 One commentator concluded that the magis-
trate system is "extremely successful" and has "introduced a more effi-
cient division of labor" in the federal trial courts.' 86 Pursuant to the
But see M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 173 (contending that the time limit provisions
have not been taken seriously by federal judges and that the Act's loopholes are being
exploited to give the appearance of compliance without providing speedier
adjudication).
a ' Mann, supra note 226, at 91. Malcolm Feeley also concedes that the Act pro-
vided an impetus for modernization of the courts, and that new methods for monitoring
the flow of cases have been instituted. M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 173-74.
'32 Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1108 (1968) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-
39 (1982) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401-02 (1982)).
'"Magistrates conduct initial proceedings in criminal cases, try and dispose of mi-
nor criminal offenses, supervise pretrial and discovery proceedings, and conduct prelim-
inary review of habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b) (1982). Amendments to
the Act in 1979 authorized magistrates with consent of the parties to try any civil case
or misdemeanor designated by a district judge and required stricter standards and pro-
cedures for appointment of magistrates. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (1979). For
discussion of the original Federal Magistrates Act, see Silberman, Masters and Magis-
trates, Part I: the American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297 (1975). For discus-
sion of the 1979 amendments, see generally Aug, The Magistrate Act of 1979: From a
Magistrate's Perspective, 49 U. CIN. L. REv 363 (1980); McCabe, the Federal Magis-
trates Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343 (1979).
2- 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a), 633(b) (1982). For a review of the role played by the
Judicial Conference, see Kerwin, supra note 203, at 430-32.
25 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982).
2S1 McCabe, supra note 233, at 356. Some commentators have been critical of the
magistrate system, and particularly of the expanded powers granted magistrates in
1979. See, e.g., Note, Article 11I Constraints and the Expanding, Civil Jurisdiction of
Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979); Note, United
States v. Raddatz: Judicial Economy at the Expense of Constitutional Guarantees, 47
BROOKLYN L. REv. 559 (1981) (arguing that the Supreme Court decision allowing
district judges to render final judgments on case-dispositive motions based on credibility
determinations by magistrate violates Article III of the Constitution); Note, The Valid-
ity of United States Magistrates Criminal Jurisdiction, 60 VA. L. REv. 697 (1974).
Practical problems with the magistrate system are discussed in Aug, supra note 233, at
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Circuit Executive Act of 1971,287 each circuit may appoint an executive
assistant to the chief judge to aid in administering circuit affairs .2
Circuit councils' 89 have complete responsibility for defining a circuit
executive's duties. 4" Finally, individual circuit and district courts have
initiated reform efforts to improve the administration of justice.
4 1
Thus, federal judges have gained substantial experience in criminal
justice reform over the last twenty years. Their expertise makes them
uniquely qualified to assist in reform of state criminal justice systems.
By improperly granting state courts greater deference than is accorded
to other branches of state government, Younger abstention shields state
criminal justice systems from direct federal court scrutiny. Of course,
the federal courts may review state practices and procedures in individ-
ual cases. The Supreme Court may review state court judgments rais-
ing federal questions and the federal courts hear individual habeas
corpus petitions. But such review has not succeeded in working sys-
temic reform of state criminal justice. The next section explores the
reasons for this failure and explains why direct, prospective injunctive
relief is necessary to achieve systemic change.
367-73.
:37 Pub. L. No. 91-647, 84 Stat. 1907 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(e)-(f) (1982)).
28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1976). See Tamm & Reardon, supra note 201, at 457-58.
's The circuit councils, or the judicial councils of the circuits as they are sometimes
called, were created as a part of the Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-
299, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1982)). The councils are em-
powered to make orders necessary for the effective administration of justice in the cir-
cuits. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1982). The councils were originally composed of all
active circuit judges within each circuit. A recent amendment requires district court
representation as well. Judicial Councils Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, §
2(a), 94 Stat. 2035 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1982)). See Remington, supra note
203, at 710, 729-30.
240 28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1982) reads in part: "The circuit executive shall exercise
such administrative powers and perform such duties as may be delegated to him by the
circuit council." For a discussion of implementation of the Circuit Executive Act, see
generally J. MCDERMOTr & S. FLANDERS, THE IMPACT OF THE CIRCUIT ExECU-
TIVE ACT (1979).
14 The Second and Eighth Circuits have instituted effective procedures for expedit-
ing appeals. See generally L. FARMER, APPEALS EXPEDITING SYSTEMS: AN EVALUA-
TION OF SECOND AND EIGHTH CIRCUIT PROCEDURES (1981). The Ninth Circuit also
has instituted programs to improve efficiency. See Deane & Tehan, Judicial Adminis-
tration in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 11 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 1, 8-19 (1981). Most district courts now utilize the individual calendar system.
Tamm & Reardon, supra note 201, at 465. Assigning each case to an individual judge




III. THE NEED FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO EFFECT
SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Although the federal courts have been much less willing to intervene
directly in state criminal justice systems than in other ,state institutions,
they have not been wholly quiescent in criminal justice reform. Indeed,
the criminal procedure innovations of the Warren Court have been
called "the most ambitious attempt in our constitutional history to illu-
minate th[e] dark underside of the [criminal] law." 4" In hindsight,
however, it is apparent that the attempt was at best only partially suc-
cessful.248 There are myriad reasons why the Warren Court failed to
achieve broad-based, systemic reform of state criminal justice. The fac-
tors that make criminal justice systems so resistant to change at the
state level 44 also frustrate reform by the federal courts. An important
additional reason for the disappointing results is that the two remedial
devices chosen by the Supreme Court - Supreme Court review of state
court judgments and federal habeas corpus - have inherent severe lim-
itations that make systemic change difficult to achieve. The Court pre-
sumably chose the devices because they are less intrusive than injunc-
tive relief. They also are much less effective. 45 Because the states have
"4 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1036.
348 See supra notes 45-48, 51-61 and accompanying text.
," See supra notes 65-94 and accompanying text.
'" The major congressional attempt to reform state criminal justice also has been
largely unsuccessful. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was
created by Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 "to
assist State and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at
every level by national assistance." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Declarations and Purpose, 82 Stat. 198 (1968) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1982)). More specifically, LEAA was established to en-
courage states and localities to research, plan, and develop innovative programs to help
reduce crime. Id. Between 1969 and 1980, LEAA distributed $7.5 billion to the states
for such programs. Diegelman, Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control: Les-
sons of the LEAA Experience, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 994, 996 (1982). Un-
fortunately, LEAA was plagued with many problems during the decade of its
operation.
Confusion regarding goals and purposes was a major problem. As one of LEAA's
first administrators pointed out, "[clertainly, from its beginnings LEAA was confronted
by conflicting expectations in the Congress, in the executive branches of government at
all levels, among the professionals in criminal justice and in the public." Rogovin, The
Genesis of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: A Personal Account, 5
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 9, 25 (1973). The initial Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act focused almost exclusively on law enforcement. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3701-97 (1982)). It was not until 1973 that the Act was amended to include
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failed to respond adequately to more gentle persuasion, it is time to use
the improvement of criminal justice and the rehabilitation of criminals in its statement
of purpose. Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, Declarations and Purpose,
87 Stat. 197 (1973) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1982)).
Critics complained that a disproportionate share of LEAA fund§ went to police agen-
cies at the expense of other components of the criminal justice system. In fiscal 1975,
for example, only 13% of LEAA's action funds were spent on adjudication of criminal
cases, and less than half of that amount went to the courts. Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 455 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) thereaf-
ter 1976 Hearings]. The excessive focus on the police component made broad systemic
reform impossible.
The assumption that crime would be prevented through a strengthened
law enforcement system is a flaw in the basic expectations of the Safe
Streets Act. Prevention and reduction of crime cannot' be adequately
achieved without concurrently addressing the other comjonents of the
criminal justice system - courts and corrections - as well as systems
involving human resources.
Rector & Wolfle, The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in Perspective, 5
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 55, 56 (1973).
Commentators also questioned the use of funds by police agencies. Critics charged
that a disproportionate amount of funds were used to purchase sophisticated police
hardware and electronic equipment. See Note, A Reexamination of the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1308 nn.38-39 (1975). For
example, in its first five years alone, LEAA spent more than $300 million on the devel-
opment of computerized information and statistics systems. See Velde, Progress in
Criminal Justice Information Systems, in PROJECT SEARCH, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AND
STATISTICS SYSTEMS 9 (1974). More frequently than not, however, the criminal his-
tory information generated by these systems was inaccurate and incomplete and thus
adversely affected the rights of criminal defendants. See generally Doernberg &
Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis of Computerized Criminal
History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110 (1980).
LEAA's effectiveness also was hampered by general maladministration in allocating
funds and monitoring their use. An internal office memorandum of the Government
Accounting Office stated that "LEAA funds have been used for projects which have
little or no relationship to improving criminal justice programming. Funds are so
widely dispersed that their potential impact is reduced." 1976 Hearings, supra, at 5
(remarks of Victor L. Lowe). Because LEAA failed to establish standards or criteria
for evaluating the projects it funded, it was unable to identify useful programs or elimi-
nate support for ineffective or inappropriate projects. Id. at 5-9. One major study found
that despite prodding from Congress, LEAA could not fully account for the billions it
spent. As of February 1975 LEAA could account for only 39.9% of its fiscal 1974
action grant funds and only 75% of its 1973 block grant funds even though it had spent
90.2% of the money. Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, reprinted in 1976 Hearings, supra, at 2126,
App. K.




Supreme Court review of state court judgments and federal habeas
corpus have many limitations in common. With either device, the ade-
quate and independent state ground rule and the guilty plea waiver
rule preclude review of federal constitutional issues raised in most state
criminal cases. A state court judgment is insulated from federal court
review if the judgment rests upon an independent state ground that is
adequate to support the judgment regardless of a federal court decision
on the federal issues involved. 4" Thus, if a criminal defendant fails to
comply with state procedural requirements for raising his federal con-
stitutional claims and is denied state court review of the claims on that
basis, the federal courts will not hear the constitutional claims. 47 In
plex bureaucratic procedures. The state planning agencies through which funds flowed
compounded the problems. Experts characterized them as "artificial, federally-created
entities that are not an integral part of state government and hence have no impact on
overall state policymaking in regard to the criminal justice system." 1976 Hearings,
supra, at 101 (remarks of Sarah C. Carey and Leda R. Judd).
When the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed LEAA in 1979, it concluded:
"Overall, the results of the program have not measured up to expectations. Significant
problems identified . . . include excessive red tape and bureaucracy; wasteful uses of
grant funds; poorly ordered priorities; lack of clearly defined Federal, State, and local
crime-fighting roles; inadequate targeting of funds; and ineffective research and statisti-
cal programs." S. REP. No. 142, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2471, 2478. Subsequently, Congress totally restructured LEAA.
Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167 (1979)
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 41, and 42 U.S.C.). Since 1979 the agency has
gradually disbanded. See Diegelman, supra, at 996.
14 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S.
441 (1935); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). The adequate and
independent state ground rule applies to both Supreme Court review of state judgments
and habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (applying the rule in
a habeas corpus case); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955); and Herndon v. Geor-
gia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (both applying the rule in Supreme Court review of state
judgment cases).
"' The rule apparently is jurisdictional in cases of Supreme Court review of state
court judgments. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (The reason for the
rule "is found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial sys-
tems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction."); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935) ("[Olur jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent
. . . and adequate to support the judgment."). In habeas corpus cases, federal courts
technically "possess the power to look beyond a state procedural forfeiture in order to
entertain the contention that a defendant's constitutional rights have been abridged,"
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 100 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal), but they apply the rule nonetheless because of considerati6ns of federalism and
comity. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976). The rule can be
avoided in habeas cases only if the petitioner shows good cause for failing to comply
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addition, a guilty plea waives all prior nonjurisdictional defects "not
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt."248
Since as many as ninety-five percent of criminal defendants plead
guilty in some jurisdictions,2 49 constitutional violations in all but a
small proportion of cases cannot be reviewed in federal court.250
In the relatively few cases that reach federal court, review is on a
case by case basis and is limited to reversal of the conviction and release
or retrial of the petitioner.2 5 ' The federal courts are unable to achieve
systemic reform or to curb widespread abuses because they can extend
relief only to petitioners, not to the class of people subjected to similar
constitutional deprivations. 252 In addition, Supreme Court review of
state judgments and federal habeas corpus can only redress past
wrongs; the federal courts cannot use these remedial devices to order
with state procedural requirements and demonstrates actual prejudice from the alleged
constitutional violation. Id. at 542. See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
Judge Gibbons has cautioned that "Irligid application of the [adequate and independent
state ground] rule to state procedural grounds which supported the judgment would
enable states to nullify the Court's intended reforms by procedural manipulations."
Gibbons, supra note 99, at 1099.
'" Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975). See also Tollett v. Hender-
son, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); Wallace v. Heinze, 351 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. Oliver, 384 U.S. 954 (1966); U.S. ex rel. Glenn v.
McMann, 349 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966).
s"o See supra note 57.
15* If state law permits an appeal of constitutional issues despite a guilty plea, the
federal courts can hear the claims as well. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 291-
92 (1975).
251 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1043. If illegally obtained evidence was
used to secure a conviction, reversal may simply result in a new trial without the
tainted evidence.
"" See Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Pro-
spective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194, 199; Weissman, supra note 8, at 517
(1974). The Supreme Court has not decided whether habeas corpus cases can be
brought as class actions. See Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2408 n.10 (1984). The
lower federal courts that have addressed this issue have disagreed. Compare Williams
v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1973), Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.
1972), and Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (federal habeas
corpus may be brought as a class action), with U.S. ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d
1115 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975), and Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d
965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal habeas corpus may not be brought as a class action).
Despite finding Rule 23 technically inapplicable in habeas cases, the Second Circuit in
Sero approved a multiparty habeas corpus proceeding similar to a class action under
the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). 506 F.2d at 1125-27. Multiparty habeas
corpus proceedings have been very rare. Note, Developments in the Law - Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1170 (1970). See generally Note, Multiparty
Federal Habeas Corpus, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1968).
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prospective changes.28 3 Reversal of a conviction "may give rise to infer-
ences about the consequences of future conduct, but it does not deter-
mine those consequences of its own force." '25 4 Moreover, reversal of a
conviction does not act directly on the officials whose behavior the court
wishes to change.285 Instead, the defendant's release is held out as an
indirect incentive to officials to alter their behavior in the future. Un-
fortunately, ambiguities in the federal court's opinion or a decision by
state officials to read the opinion narrowly may blunt the ruling's al-
ready limited effect on the day-to-day operations of state criminal
justice.
256
The ineffectiveness of the exclusionary rule in deterring state police
misconduct provides a concrete and widely documented example of the
inherent limitations of after-the-fact review in individual criminal cases
as a means of working systemic reform of state criminal justice.2, 7 Crit-
ics of the rule have argued that it is ineffective because it imposes no
punishment on the offending police officer 8 and does nothing to re-
form police department policies and procedures.25 ' Even in instances in
which department policy encourages observance of constitutional rights,
'53 Laycock, supra note 252, at 194, 199-200. See also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra
note 5, at 1039-40.
' Laycock, supra note 252, at 200.
, Professors Cover and Aleinikoff have found it to be "remarkable" and "startling"
that the far-reaching criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court "would be an-
nounced with no remedial instrument whatsoever acting directly, coercively or prospec-
tively upon the persons whose behavior was purportedly controlled." Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1039-40.
'" See S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME
PERSPECTIVES 154-62, 188, 197 (1970); Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the
Police Organization, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 482-83 (1971).
257 The Supreme Court first extended the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and required the suppression of evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment. The rule also requires exclusion of identification
testimony secured in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments, Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 269-74 (1967), of confessions obtained in violation of the fifth amend-
ment, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961), and of evidence obtained by methods so shocking to the conscience as to violate
due process, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
'" See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Ex-
clusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 665; Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 709-10, 725-
26 (1970).
19 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 31 (1967) [hereafter TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE]; Oaks, supra note 258, at 729.
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individual police officers normally operate out of view of supervisors or
prosecutors.2 ° In addition, the exclusionary rule does nothing to deter
misconduct in cases when the police either do not wish to prosecute or
have goals besides prosecution.261 When prosecution does result, hear-
ings on claimed constitutional violations often are swearing contests be-
tween the police officer and the defendant. Unless the officer is caught
in a clumsy lie, the officer's version of events usually is believed. 62
Moreover, case law defining constitutional standards of police behavior
is ambiguous, complex, and ever changing. It thus provides limited
guidance to the police.2 " Finally, when a case reaches the Supreme
Court from the highest state court or is brought before a federal district
judge by way of habeas corpus, the federal court has only the cold rec-
ord before it and is limited by the scope of appellate review. 6
In addition to the many shortcomings that Supreme Court review of
state court judgments and federal habeas corpus have in common, each
device has its own limitations that restrict its usefulness in achieving
systemic reform. The chief limitation of Supreme Court review of state
court judgments is that the Court can fully review only a few cases
60 See J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 30-32 (1968); Goldstein, Po-
lice Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 543 (1960); Murphy, The Problem of
Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEX. L. REV. 939, 940-41 (1966).
261 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968). See also TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
POLICE, supra note 259, at 18-19, 31; Milner, supra note 256, at 475-76. Such goals
include confiscating contraband, controlling prostitutes, searching for weapons as self-
protection, harassment, and establishing and maintaining police authority. See gener-
ally id. at 476-80; Oaks, supra note 258, at 721-22.
'62 Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 645, 658-59 (1967); Geller, supra note 258, at 671; Oaks, supra note
258, at 725; Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 839, 839-40 (1974).
263 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 417 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Murphy, supra note 260, at 940, 942; Oaks, supra note 258, at 731.
2'4 See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 50-52 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597-98 (1948) (all holding contested
factual issues authoritatively resolved by state court findings). In post-conviction habeas
corpus proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) requires that a state court determina-
tion on the merits of a factual issue made after a hearing and evidenced by written
findings shall be presumed correct, with certain limited exceptions. See Sumner v.
Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 493-95 (1976),
the Supreme Court greatly restricted the scope of federal habeas corpus in reviewing
search and seizure claims by holding habeas unavailable when the petitioner had an




each year."65 A prisoner must exhaust available state court remedies
before applying for federal habeas corpus. 2" In addition, discovery is
available in habeas cases only with the permission of the court.2e7 Fi-
nally, the right to assignment of counsel is very limited in habeas
cases. 2" Even the relatively straightforward procedural requirements of
these summary proceedings baffle most state prisoners who are often
uneducated and almost always untutored in the law."'9 It is hardly sur-
prising that few pro se litigants surmount these obstacles and present
convincing legal arguments. °
268 For example, in the October, 1982 Term, only 183 cases were argued in the
Supreme Court; only a portion of these, of course, involved review of state court judg-
ments. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 199, at
219, Table A-I.
266 The exhaustion requirement applies to both pretrial and postconviction applica-
tions. Exhaustion of state remedies before trial is mandated by the Court's decision in
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), while exhaustion of postconviction remedies is
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982). In recent years the federal courts have tight-
ened the exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)
(state petitioner must have fairly presented the substance of his federal claim to state
court to have properly exhausted); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982)
(habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims must be dismissed).
One line of cases places state prisoners in a Catch-22 situation by requiring that denial
of speedy trial claims first be presented as a defense at a state trial before the case
comes to federal court. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d
292 (2d Cir. 1976); Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976); Moore v. De-
Young, 515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial
and the Exhaustion Requirement of Federal Habeas Corpus, 1977 DUKE L.J. 707.
217 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1969). Courts often withhold permis-
sion. See, e.g., Loper v. Beto, 440 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel.
O'Neill v. Neff, 326 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
2" Some federal courts have held that due process requires assignment of counsel if
a meaningful hearing of an apparently substantial claim is impossible without counsel.
See, e.g., Shelby v. Phend, 445 F.2d 1326, 1328 (7th Cir. 1971); Roach v. Bennett, 392
F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d
707, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1960). The burden remains on the petitioner, however, to make a
strong preliminary showing of merit as a precondition to assignment of counsel. The
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, see supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text, was
amended in 1970 to provide compensation for attorneys appointed in habeas corpus
cases. Act of Oct. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447, § 1(d), 84 Stat. 916 (1970) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(g) (1982)). Compensation is limited, however, to $250. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006(A)(d)(2) (1982).
2I See generally Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro
se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 159, 173-84 (1972).
270 Id. at 198-201. The problems are merely compounded when pro se habeas peti-
tioners seek to appeal. See generally id. at 219-26. As a result, "[flew pro se appeals
survive preliminary screening. Of those that do, even fewer obtain final relief on the
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Injunctions are much more likely to effect systemic reform of state
criminal justice because they do not suffer all of the inherent limitations
of Supreme Court review of state judgments and habeas corpus. Review
need not be case by case. Federal courts can entertain actions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of classes drawn as
broadly as necessary to encompass the constitutional violation. Relief is
not limited to reversal of a conviction or release of an individual peti-
tioner. The federal court can order prospective change in criminal jus-
tice practices and procedures. An injunction works directly upon the
officials whose behavior the court wishes to change;2"1 it also can mod-
ify the official policy of an institution of state criminal justice. The
court is not limited to a cold record of past events that took place en-
tirely out of its view. Present practices and procedures can be fully in-
vestigated under the broad civil discovery rules,2"2 and the federal court
can conduct hearings and take testimony until it is satisfied that the
record is fully developed. Finally, a federal district court can take the
initiative in granting injunctive relief. It need not wait, as the Supreme
Court must, until a final judgment is rendered "by the highest court of
a State in which a decision could be had." '278 And, unlike federal
habeas corpus, injunctions do not require that plaintiffs exhaust availa-
ble state remedies in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section
merits." Id. at 246 (citations omitted).
Civil damage actions or criminal prosecutions also are ill-suited to achieving systemic
reform. State judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune in § 1983 damage actions,
see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976), and executive officials such as police and corrections officers enjoy a good faith
defense. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Victims of abuse by such officers may fear reprisals if they sue. They sometimes waive
potential claims in exchange for a more favorable plea. See Geller, supra note 258, at
692; Sevilla, supra note 262, at 847. If a civil action is brought, some delay inevitably
occurs before trial, thus lessening the deterrent effect of the suit. Id. at 846-47. At trial,
jurors tend to favor police and corrections officials over those charged with or convicted
of crime, and they are reluctant to award damages. Geller, supra, at 692-93; Oaks,
supra note 258, at 673. Prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute officers for criminal
activity, and jurors are reluctant to convict. Id.; Geller, supra, at 714-15; Sevilla,
supra, at 850. The Supreme Court has called criminal remedies "worthless and futile"
in deterring unlawful search and seizure by police. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
652 (1961).
1 Although evasion and inaction may still occur, it is significantly more difficult for
a state official to ignore a federal court injunction aimed directly at her than to ignore a
declaration of proper procedure contained in a federal court opinion only ordering re-
lease of an individual defendant.
S72 See FED. R/biv. P. 26-37.
273 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
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1983.274 In sum, since the injunction is substantially more powerful
than the other remedial devices used by the federal courts, it is more
likely to be effective in achieving change.
The first three sections of this Article have demonstrated why the
federal courts should use their injunctive powers to reform state crimi-
nal justice systems. Section IV considers how these powers can best be
used.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE REFORM OF STATE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The federal courts would enter well-charted territory if they began to
entertain actions seeking systemic reform of state criminal justice sys-
tems. The courts and the public interest bar have thirty years of experi-
ence in institutional reform litigation. They have learned how to make
such actions manageable and how to implement relief. In addition, a
lively and continuing debate has emerged in the literature concerning
the legitimacy and effectiveness of institutional reform litigation. 275 The
commentaries of both proponents and critics can inform and guide fed-
eral judicial reform of state criminal justice.
This section applies the lessons learned in desegregation, reappor-
tionment, and prisoners' rights cases to litigation seeking reform of state
criminal justice systems. It provides a general blueprint for such ac-
tions. 27 ' Although specific plans for all cases are impossible to frame
because the scope and course of particular actions will vary according
to local conditions, this section proposes guidelines to assist litigants and
the courts in structuring and adjudicating criminal justice reform cases.
'71 Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
183 (1961). As with habeas corpus, plaintiffs have no general right to assignment of
counsel in § 1983 cases. However, the large public defender organizations in the major
urban centers where the problems with state criminal justice are most severe can pre-
sumably devote some resources to institutional reform litigation as a part of providing
full representation for their clients. In New York City, for example, the Legal Aid
Society's Criminal Defense Division employs a small corps of attorneys in the Special
Litigation Unit to bring such actions.
'76 Compare Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979),
and Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976) (both generally favoring federal court intervention to reform errant state bu-
reaucracies), with Fletcher, supra note 17, and D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1977) (both generally opposing structural reform litigation).
'76 This section assumes that plaintiffs' claims have constitutional merit in all cases
discussed, both real and hypothetical. The assumption is necessary to the discussion, for
if a claim is insubstantial, a court can avoid the issues considered here by simply dis-
missing the case.
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Several threshold obstacles will inhibit reform. Change will occur
only if the courts understand and overcome the key impediments to
change. Many of the factors that make criminal justice systems so
highly resistant to change at the state level will hinder federal courts as
well. The fragmentation of power and decentralization of administra-
tion in state criminal justice2"7 will make it difficult to induce criminal
justice officials to work together. 8 Of course, a federal court is not
limited by separation of powers principles 79 or by state constitutional
or statutory provisions that prohibit any single state agency from insti-
tuting broad criminal justice reform.2 80 Nonetheless, the traditional in-
dependence of criminal justice officials will make it difficult for a fed-
eral court to enforce remedial orders that require coordinated action by
different components of the system. 81 In addition, the disparate values
and goals of the different actors in the criminal process2 82 will limit
discovery of common ground.
The broad discretion of criminal justice officials will also impede fed-
eral court reform efforts. Effective change often will require altering
the way officials exercise discretion. 283 A court can monitor perform-
ance of a mechanical or ministerial act with relative ease, but how is it
to enforce an order directing officials to make discretionary decisions in
a fairer, wiser, more just manner? This problem cannot be avoided by
restricting the exercise of discretion in the criminal process. To do jus-
tice, police officers, prosecutors, and judges must tailor their actions,
recommendations, and decisions to the facts of individual cases. Reform
277 See supra notes 52-54, 65-69 and accompanying text.
278 See M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 37.
79 See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) ("[T]he separation-of-powers prin-
ciple . . . has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States."). See
also Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). But see Nagel, Separation of Powers and the
Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) (contending that
separation of powers principles limit the authority of federal courts to undertake legis-
lative and executive functions in suits against state officials).
so See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
281 Id. Indeed, some observers question whether participants in the criminal process
actually desire change at all. See, e.g., M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 192; M. LEVIN,
supra note 79, at 213; R. NiMMER, supra note 73, at 176-77. Lawrence T. Kurlander,
New York State Director of Criminal Justice, recently stated: "I have noticed . . . an
enormous resistance to change. Try and think back to when prosecutors last had an
innovative idea .... The courts perhaps are the most resistant to change." N.Y.
Times, July 17, 1983, § 4 (The Week in Review) at 6, cols. 3-4.
282 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
83 R. NIMMER, supra note 73, at 23.
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requires that these officials have discretion.2""
A federal court may also have trouble anticipating the unintended,
indirect effects that orders aimed at one part of the criminal justice
system will have on other parts. Unintended effects most likely will
occur if change concerns a stage of the process at which many agencies
interact. For example, if a federal court ordered prosecutors to give
detailed statements of the factual bases for their bail recommendations
or to explain why nonfinancial release alternatives would not suffice in
lieu of money bail, the change would affect defense counsel and the
criminal court. The order would slow the pace of the proceedings, per-
haps necessitating more arraignment parts. The change also might re-
quire expansion of the agency charged with investigating the defen-
dant's background and roots in the community. The difficulty in
predicting the consequences of a federal court order in cases involving
such many-centered, or "polycentric", problems has led some commen-
tators to question whether such cases are suitable for judicial interven-
tion. a8 As in other areas, federal courts will be challenged and some-
times perplexed by the complexities of devising and implementing
effective relief.
280
Finally, some reforms will cost money. Enhancing procedural due
process requires that judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel spend
more time on each case. Therefore, more of these officers will be
needed to avoid even larger backlogs. Adding professional personnel in
turn may require increased support staff and new physical facilities. In
other areas, federal courts have been extremely reluctant to order state
officials to spend more money remedying constitutional violations,
2 87
'" Id. ("[D]iscretionary justice is the setting within which a reform must operate. It
is not within the power of the reform to redefine the setting by fiat." (emphasis in
original)).
185 See, e.g., D. HoRowITz, supra note 275, at 59; Fletcher, supra note 17, at 645-
49; Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 398
(1978).
286 As Owen Fiss has noted, the reconstruction of any bureaucracy entails problems
of polycentrism. Fiss, supra note 275, at 41.
... In prisoners' rights cases, for example, courts have closed prisons or released
prisoners instead of ordering physical renovations or the construction of new prisons.
See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98 (1st Cir. 1978)
(Boston's Charles Street Jail closed and court declined to order state officials to appro-
priate additional monies for alternate facilities); Anderson v. Redman, 429 F. Supp.
1105, 1127-28 (D. Del. 1977) (release ordered to reduce prison population); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995, 999-1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974) (New York City's Tombs prison closed); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp 1182,
1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (voters not required to make funds available but court can order
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despite lip service to the principle that lack of resources cannot justify
failure to honor constitutional rights.28 Attempts to work reform with-
out increasing resources, however, may have unanticipated and even
counterproductive results. If, for example, a federal court ordered the
change in bail practices suggested above without also requiring alloca-
tion of additional resources, state court administrators might be forced
to take judges from trial parts to staff arraignment parts. Fewer trial
parts would result in fewer trials and in a longer wait for trials.
These problems present formidable obstacles to federal court reform
of state criminal justice systems. The guidelines suggested below re-
spond to these problems and provide ways to minimize them. By ob-
serving the proposed principles, the public interest bar and the federal
courts can achieve significant reform of state criminal practices and
procedures while avoiding major problems of manageability and relief
implementation.
A. Limit Remedies to Redress of Federal Constitution Violations
The first guideline is a cautionary reminder: Federal courts are
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction; they may hear only diver-
sity cases and cases arising under the federal constitution and laws. 8"9
Although plaintiffs' counsel might seek to invoke diversity jurisdiction
by designating out-of-state arrestees as named plaintiffs in class ac-
tions, 90 the state law claims presented in such cases ordinarily would
not provide grounds for systemic relief.29 In addition, since few federal
release of prisoners held under unconstitutional conditions of confinement).
'" See, e.g., Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 898 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Barnes v.
Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1227 (D.V.I. 1976); Alberti v.
Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649, 669 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
2s9 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
'9 In assessing the citizenship of parties for jurisdictional purposes in class actions,
courts look only to the citizenship of the named parties. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). Thus, the presence of nondiverse members of the plain-
tiff class would not defeat diversity if the named plaintiffs had citizenship diverse from
the defendant state officials.
291 Even when state law provides a basis for systemic relief, federal courts may lack
power to order injunctive relief against state officials for violation of state law. The
Supreme Court recently held that the eleventh amendment forbade such an order in a
federal question case in which the lower court had entertained the state law claim
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, Inc. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Although Pennhurst did not address the propriety of
such relief when the ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction is diversity, the Su-
preme Court has on occasion refused to entertain state law claims in diversity cases.
See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Corp. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
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statutes regulate the state criminal process, criminal justice reform liti-
gation generally must allege violations of federal constitutional rights to
invoke federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, litigants should ask the
federal courts to restructure state institutions only when such relief is
constitutionally compelled, and the courts should resist the temptation
to order relief simply because it increases the general fairness or effi-
ciency of the system. The courts do not "hold . . .roving commissions
as problem solvers ... ."9' They may only require state criminal jus-
tice systems to comply with minimum constitutional safeguards.293
B. Focus Litigation on Reform of State Procedures
Plaintiffs should emphasize procedural reform. Dean Lon Fuller
wrote of the importance of procedure to the judicial function:
The essence of the judicial function lies not in the substance of the conclu-
sion reached, but in the procedures by which that substance is guaranteed.
One does not become a judge by acting intelligently and fairly, but by
accepting procedural restraints designed to insure - so far as human na-
ture permits - an impartial and informed outcome of the process of
decision.""
Fair process and the acceptance of procedural restraints also can ensure
impartial and informed decisionmaking by police and prosecutors.
2 95
The federal courts are particularly able to assist state criminal justice
officials in correcting procedural deficiencies because courts have special
knowledge about the uses of procedure."' Federal courts are expert at
examining disputes between citizens and government and determining
the process due a citizen before government may deprive the citizen of a
liberty or property interest.297 Thus, the district court in Rizzo v.
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933).
so A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 134 (1970).
"" In prisoners' rights cases courts have often looked to professionally compiled min-
imum standards for institutional confinement but have not ordered states to provide
model prisons. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation,
91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 438 (1977) [hereafter Note, Implementation Problems). In the
criminal justice area generally, the federal courts might consult the American Bar Asso-
ciation's multi-volume work, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
29 Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 WIS. L. REV. 3, 18.
s The exclusionary rule, for example, seeks to enforce police compliance with es-
tablished procedural requirements. See supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
I '" D. HOROWITZ, supra note 275, at 59. See also M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at
214-15; Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Consti-
tutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 379 (1984).
29 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-74 (1974) (placement in segre-
19851
University of California, Davis
Goode29 acted within its expertise when it reviewed Philadelphia po-
lice department procedures for processing civilian complaints and or-
dered changes.2 99 Similarly, a federal court is particularly competent to
evaluate the constitutionality of detaining a person for a significant pe-
riod without a judicial determination of probable cause,300 of setting
money bail according to a pre-established schedule without considering
individual factors," 0' or of using inaccurate and incomplete criminal
history information in making any decision concerning a defendant's
liberty. °2
The federal courts also have long experience adjudicating claims of
denial of equal protection in state practices and procedures. 03 There-
fore, suits seeking to ensure that indigent defendants receive transcripts
of court proceedings as promptly as those who pay for them,30 or ques-
tioning a judge's practice of setting bail in nonjailable cases and incar-
gation in prison); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of parole);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Thorpe
v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (eviction from public housing pro-
ject); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 972 (1971) (dismissal as school teacher).
2 8 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
29 Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability & Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357
F. Supp. 1289, 1320-21 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd sub nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542
(3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
300 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Bernard v. City of Palo Alto,
699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.
Tex. 1982).
801 See, e.g., Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
302 See Tatum v. Rogers, No. 75 Civ. 2782 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1979). See
generally Doernberg & Zeigler, supra note 245.
380 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding state laws deny-
ing welfare to all noncitizens violative of the equal protection clause); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating on equal protection grounds Virginia law
prohibiting interracial marriage); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (holding violative of equal protection clause a Virginia law making payment of
poll tax a precondition for voting); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (invali-
dating on equal protection grounds a state law requiring that the race of each candidate
appear on the ballot); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that racial
discrimination in the administration of municipal ordinance violated the equal protec-
tion clause).
804 See, e.g., Simmons v. Maslysnky, 45 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Washington v.
Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (holding such claims
cognizable in § 1983 action). But see Leslie v. Matzkin, 450 F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir.
1971) (abstaining in case challenging state failure to provide indigent defendants with
preliminary hearing minutes), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
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cerating those who could not post the bail,30 or challenging invidious
discrimination in grand or petit juror selection procedures... plainly
raise equal protection issues that fall within the federal courts' special
competence in procedural matters. Moreover, as discussed above, the
federal courts have gained additional experience in procedural reform
by methodically upgrading the federal criminal justice system to en-
hance procedural due process and guarantee equal protection of the
laws.
0 7
C. Avoid Review of Individual Discretionary Decisions
Federal courts may reasonably order state criminal justice officials to
implement procedures that meet minimum constitutional standards;
they should avoid second-guessing discretionary decisions by state offi-
cials in individual criminal cases. Federal courts simply cannot monitor
all aspects of state practice or provide immediate individual review each
time a defendant's rights arguably are violated in the course of a state
808 See Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984).
See, e.g., Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury
Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807, 830 n.49 (5th Cir. 1980) (entertaining a class action by com-
munity residents seeking prospective injunctive relief against discriminatory grand jury
selection procedures), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981). But see Diaz v. Stathis, 576
F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1978) (abstaining in action by defendants and a plaintiff in pend-
ing state criminal and civil proceedings, respectively, seeking injunctive relief reforming
discriminatory grand and petit juror selection procedures); Bryant v. Morgan, 451 F.2d
354, 355 (5th Cir. 1971) (abstaining in case attacking trial jury selection procedures
brought by persons under indictment in state court).
$07 See supra Section II D. Federal courts will generally not need to make direct
injunctive intrusions into substantive aspects of the state criminal process. The malad-
ministration of laws, not the laws' substance, is the major problem of American crimi-
nal justice. See supra notes 45-89 and accompanying text. Thus, for example, a federal
judge will rarely order a state not to make particular conduct criminal or not to impose
a particular sanction for violation of a criminal statute. In addition, in many instances
defendants can effectively challenge unfair substantive provisions in individual criminal
appeals or by way of federal habeas corpus and thus make injunctive relief
unnecessary.
In some cases, however, the federal courts will have no choice but -to attempt sub-
stantive reform of state criminal justice. Constitutional guarantees extend beyond proce-
dural rights. When state officials violate a constitutional provision that reflects substan-
tive values, federal courts must act to vindicate the constitutional right. Thus, if a state
violated the first amendment by making it a crime to stand and speak in a public
square or violated the eighth amendment by requiring a life sentence for simple tres-
pass, a federal court should intervene directly despite the substantive choices underlying
such laws. In addition, as any student of the Erie doctrine knows, no bright line divides
substance from procedure. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
Some reforms will inevitably contain elements of both.
1985]
University of California, Davis
prosecution. Moreover, if each defendant were entitled to interlocutory
review of every state action, state criminal justice systems would be im-
practicably hindered.308 Thus, a federal court might order a police de-
partment to adopt procedures for investigating civilian complaints, but
it should avoid reviewing determinations that no action is warranted in
particular cases. Similarly, a federal court might order state judges to
provide procedural safeguards in setting pretrial release conditions, but
it should avoid reviewing individual bail decisions.
The suggestion that federal courts limit relief in this way raises two
important questions. The first is whether relief can be effective if a
federal court does not adjudicate individual assertions of noncompliance
with its orders. The second is whether relief can as a practical matter
be limited in the manner suggested. If federal courts abandon the
Younger abstention doctrine, will they be inundated with thousands of
lawsuits seeking intervention in individual criminal cases?
As to the first question, a court rarely achieves effective change
merely by ordering the adoption of minimum procedural safeguards.
The federal court must rely on state officials to apply new procedures
fully, fairly, and in good faith. Nevertheless, these officials may merely
go through the motions, truncating processes or abandoning some new
procedures altogether if they prove time consuming or tedious. Encour-
aging officials to embrace reform is difficult with no tangible incen-
tives. 09 A federal court may need to detail the precise steps that offi-
cials must follow. A court may have to appoint special masters,
ombudsmen, or committees to sit in clerks' offices, police precincts, and
courtrooms to monitor implementation of its orders and to report back
on evasions or deficiencies in compliance. It may need to issue addi-
tional orders to clarify ambiguities in earlier orders or monitor proceed-
ings periodically to guard against backsliding. In many instances these
extra actions will convince officials to exercise their discretion more
wisely and to proceed more fairly. In other cases, total compliance will
be impossible to achieve. Despite such disappointments, however, a fed-
eral court should not perform the functions of state criminal justice offi-
cials. Rather, the court should try to induce the officials to do their own
job properly.
308 Zeigler, supra note 1, at 286. Cf Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A
Strategy for Judicial Enforcement of Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV.
399, 406-07 (1981) (suggesting that interference with decisions customarily within the
discretion of institutional managers may heighten resistance to a federal court decree).
809 See M. LEVIN, supra note 79, at 210-11.
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As to the second question, in Stefanelli v. Minard1 0 Justice
Frankfurter forcefully stated for the Court that direct federal court in-
tervention in state criminal justice would lead to a flood of litigation.""1
Justice Frankfurter wrote:
If we were to [suppress illegally seized evidence in this pending state pros-
ecution], we would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupporta-
ble disruption. Every question of procedural due process of law - with its
far-flung and undefined range - would invite a flanking movement
against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with
review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue. Asserted unconsti-
tutionality in the empaneling and selection of grand and petit juries, in the
failure to appoint counsel, in the admisson of a confession, in the creation
of an unfair trial atmosphere, in the misconduct of the trial court - all
would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be
bound to employ, to subvert the orderly, effective prosecution of local
crime in local courts.
Moreover, the Court decided Stefanelli before its decisions granting in-
digent defendants the right to assignment of counsel."1 2 If Justice
Frankfurter were writing today, he might suggest that assigned counsel
across the nation would file thousands of section 1983 actions on behalf
of their indigent clients challenging every colorable denial of a federal
constitutional right in the state criminal process.
As with many "parade of horribles" arguments, however, neither
Justice Frankfurter's original spectre nor the updated version can with-
stand close scrutiny. Both ignore the realities of the day-to-day work-
ings of state criminal justice systems, as well as the legal doctrines and
procedural devices available to the federal courts to deflect premature
applications and to manage litigation. As a practical matter, if the
Younger doctrine is abandoned, section 1983 actions complaining of
constitutional irregularities in individual criminal cases will not seri-
ously disrupt the state criminal process or overburden the federal
courts.
Most state criminal cases involve relatively petty charges. " Defen-
310 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
.. Id. at 123-24. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (claiming
that prospective injunctive relief against state criminal justice officials would require
"interruption of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance... [in] an
ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings . . ").
" See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requiring assigned counsel in
any case in which the defendant faces loss of liberty); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (granting indigent criminal defendants a right to assigned counsel in felony
prosecutions).
81' See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1982, at
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dants in such cases would rarely seek federal review. Many petty cases
are dismissed at arraignment, if not before.31 4 In the remainder, defen-
dants usually wish to negotiate a guilty plea that allows them to go
home immediately or after serving only a few days in jail. 1 ' In short,
the client will not want to make a federal case out of the vast majority
of state criminal prosecutions.
Serious charges would give defendants a greater incentive to invoke
the federal forum if it were available, but most such applications would
be deflected by the doctrine of Preiser v. Rodriguez.31 Preiser prohib-
its federal injunctive relief that results either directly or indirectly in
release of a defendant from state custody because the exclusive vehicle
for such relief is habeas corpus.31 7 Although Preiser involved convicted
prisoners held in physical custody, the Preiser doctrine also bars per-
sons charged with crimes 8' who are under any form of state supervi-
sory control from seeking "release" under section 1983. s'" The doctrine
172 (1983) (showing arrests for such crimes as drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and
"other" offenses far outnumber arrests for more serious, violent crimes such as rape,
robbery, and murder).
314 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 44, at 133 ("The limited statistics avail-
able indicate that approximately one-half of [persons] arrested [have their cases] dis-
missed by the police, a prosecutor, or a magistrate at an early stage. ... ").
815 L. KATZ, L. LITWIN, & R. BAMBERGER, supra note 46, at 107-08. See TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 30-31.
3-6 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
817 The plaintiffs in Preiser alleged that procedural deficiencies in state prison disci-
plinary proceedings caused unjust denial of good-time credits in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. They brought a § 1983 action seeking
restoration of the credits. Id. at 471. The Supreme Court held that § 1983 could not be
used because habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy available to a state prisoner who
challenges "the very fact or duration" of confinement and who seeks relief entitling him
"to immediate release or a speedier release" from incarceration. Id. at 500. Because
habeas corpus requires petitioners to exhaust available state remedies before seeking
federal relief, see supra note 266, the Court ordered the action dismissed. 411 U.S. at
500.
318 In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107 n.6 (1975), the Supreme Court made
clear that Preiser applies before trial. See also Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323,
328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge court), affd, 412 U.S. 914 (1973) (Preiser pre-
sumed to bar release of indicted but untried defendants challenging procedures for com-
mitment to mental institutions). Cf. Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640, 645-46 (M.D.
Pa. 1976) (Preiser presumed to bar § 1983 suit seeking release by persons challenging
state law permitting voluntary and indefinite commitment of persons needing care be-
cause of mental disability).
819 Virtually everyone charged with crime satisfies the custody requirement for fed-
eral habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1982), because the public at large does
not share the restraints on their liberty. Courts have held custody for habeas purposes
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thus prohibits an order directly enjoining a pending state criminal pro-
ceeding because the dismissal of the charges would result in the defen-
dant's unconditional release from state custody.""0 It also bars federal
suppression of illegally seized evidence as requested in Stefanelli v.
Minard21 because a federal suppression order ordinarily would effec-
tively terminate the state criminal case.322 Preiser would also bar sec-
tion 1983 challenges to the admission of a coerced confession or a
tainted identification if exclusion of the evidence would terminate the
prosecution. Indeed, Preiser would prohibit virtually every section 1983
case challenging a constitutional error in a state criminal case if the
error was sufficiently serious to merit dismissal of the charges. Plainly,
then, even if courts abandon the Younger doctrine, the doctrine of
Preiser v. Rodriguez would severely limit the number of section 1983
actions filed by individual state criminal defendants because the relief
they most want is unavailable.
Preiser, of course, does not bar all section 1983 actions involving
state criminal justice. Persons in state custody may seek prospective in-
junctive relief to modify constitutionally defective practices and proce-
dures without running afoul of the Preiser rule.23 The federal courts
to include pretrial release on bail. See, e.g., Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1141-42
(7th Cir. 1982); Delk v. Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1981); United States ex
rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 483 F.2d 7, 12 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Burris v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 1968).
Even release on one's own recognizance constitutes custody. See Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349 (1973); Kolski v. Watkins, 544 F.2d 762, 763 n.2 (5th Cir.
1977); United States ex rel. Triano v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 393 F. Supp.
1061, 1065 (D.N.J.), affd, 523 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056
(1976). Pretrial release in the custody of one's attorney has also been held to satisfy the
custody requirement. See, e.g., Foster v. Gilbert, 264 F. Supp. 209, 211-12 (S.D. Fla.
1967). Since federal habeas corpus is technically available before trial to virtually all
state defendants upon exhaustion of state remedies, Preiser mandates that defendants
pursue this avenue rather than a § 1983 action if they seek release from custody.
320 Therefore, even if the doctrine of Younger v. Harris were abandoned, plaintiffs
in a case like Younger would be barred by Preiser from bringing a § 1983 action
challenging the constitutionality of the state statute on which their prosecution was
based. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Plaintiff Harris sought an injunc-
tion against his prosecution under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act on the
grounds that the statute violated the first amendment.).
321 342 U.S. 117 (1951). See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
12 See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d
848, 851 (1st Cir. 1978).
"" See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107 n.6 (1975) (holding that a class of
state criminal defendants could request that state officials be ordered to give them prob-
able cause determinations without violating the Preiser rule.); Fernandez v. Trias
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distinguish such relief from habeas corpus relief even though fairer pro-
cedures may result in the release of some persons who otherwise would
have remained in custody. 2 ' The courts reason that release in these
circumstances is speculative and indefinite because it depends upon the
subsequent discretionary decisions of state officials. 25 Therefore, in the
absence of the Younger doctrine, state criminal defendants could bring
section 1983 actions asking the federal courts to order prompt probable
cause determinations, 8' the proper assignment of counsel, 2 7 or modifi-
cation of petit jury selection procedures. 28 Preiser would not bar these
types of relief because the plaintiffs would not be seeking release from
custody.
If the Younger doctrine were abrogated, it seems likely that criminal
Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978) (same); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555 (1974) (holding that action seeking prospective reform of prison disciplinary
procedures could proceed under § 1983 without violating Preiser doctrine.); Walker v.
Prisoner Review Bd., 694 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1982) (Prospective injunctive relief
modifying state procedures for parole of prisoners was properly sought under § 1983
rather than by way of federal habeas corpus.); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1150
(2d Cir. 1977) (same); Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd., 509
F.2d 820, 823-24 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 733-34
(4th Cir. 1974), dismissed as moot, 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (same); Chancery Clerk of
Chickasaw County, Miss. v. Wallace, 646 F.2d 151, 155-58 (5th Cir. 1981) (A class
action seeking prospective change in procedures for the involuntary commitment of
adults was not barred by Preiser.); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640, 645-46 (M.D. Pa.
1976) (same); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 296 (D. Md. 1979) (holding
class action seeking change in the Maryland procedures for civil commitment of
juveniles was properly brought under § 1983 rather than by way of habeas corpus.).
824 Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d 848, 852 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978); Williams v.
Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1150 (2d Cir. 1977).
325 See, e.g., Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd., 509 F.2d 820,
824 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he specific and concrete effect of [the injunctive relief sought]
on the status of each prisoner is highly speculative."); Haymes v. Regan, 394 F. Supp.
711, 713-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd as modified, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975):
[A] new release hearing. . . provides no guarantee of release, particularly
in light of the discretionary nature of parole . . . . The touchstone of
habeas relief would, therefore, appear to be immediacy or certainty of re-
lease. . . . Since the relief requested by plaintiff cannot result in the defi-
nite speed-up of his release . . . the Court's jurisdiction properly arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) as implemented by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather
than 28 U.S.C. § 2254. . ..
Id. See also Chancery Clerk of Chickasaw County, Miss. v. Wallace, 646 F.2d at 155-
58; Fernandez v. Trias Monge, 586 F.2d at 852 n.4; Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d at
1150.
:" See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103.
21 See, e.g., Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
"" See, e.g., Bryant v. Morgan, 451 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1971).
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defendants facing serious charges would file many section 1983 cases
seeking prospective modification of state procedures. Once again, how-
ever, the realities of the day-to-day workings of the state criminal pro-
cess would diminish the disruptive impact of such suits. Cases involving
serious charges, like petty cases not dismissed outright, are almost al-
ways disposed of by guilty plea in most jurisdictions.829 The negotia-
tions simply take longer in serious cases. If a defendant suffered some
serious procedural irregularity, defense counsel might file a federal ac-
tion, or might threaten to do so. Because of Preiser, however, counsel
could ask only that the defective process be repeated as remedied, or
that the defendant be accorded the procedural right that had been
ignored.
Since such relief would often be of limited practical utility, the fed-
eral suit would probably become a factor in the plea-bargaining pro-
cess. Defense counsel could use the federal suit, or the threat of one, to
negotiate a more favorable plea, in much the same way as counsel pres-
ently use a questionable search for that purpose. A federal action would
complicate the state prosecution, and perhaps cause some delay, thus
inducing the prosecutor to cooperate in negotiations. It would not be in
the defendant's best interest to press the federal action too vigorously or
to seek an unreasonable bargain because federal relief, even if granted,
would be unlikely to give the defendant any major strategic advantage.
Eventually, the defendant would plead guilty. A guilty plea, of course,
waives all prior nonjurisdictional defects,830 and the federal suit could
promptly be terminated by voluntary dismissal88 or on the prosecutor's
motion.83 2
In addition, the federal courts have ample means to manage section
1983 suits seeking prospective change in state practices and procedures.
If several cases raised the same claim, the court might order them con-
solidated.883 If a large number of cases complained of the same consti-
tutional violation, the court might convert them into a class actions "
and appoint counsel experienced in conducting federal civil litigation to
represent the class.38 6 The court has broad discretionary power under
119 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
330 See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
33I See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
83 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
38 See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
835 If several class members are represented by separate counsel, the court may des-
ignate a chief or lead counsel. See Farber v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 442 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1971). In large urban jurisdictions, a public defender organization might be will-
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) and (d) to limit and define the
claims raised in a class action.' 6 Subsequent suits raising the same
claims could be consolidated with the class suit,337 or the new claimants
might be allowed to intervene. 8' Finally, in some instances the federal
court would decide that the challenged state procedures pass constitu-
tional muster. Principles of res judicata or stare decisis would then
serve to preclude further litigation by disgruntled class members or by
newly charged criminal defendants seeking to raise the same claim.339
D. Focus the Litigation on a Single Agency
Plaintiffs can greatly reduce the complexity of a criminal justice re-
form case by focusing on the practices of a single agency. Such a suit
may work important changes despite its relatively narrow focus. A
court can review the internal procedures of one administrative unit for
fairness and consistency and can order discrete changes. A focus on one
agency avoids the problems of differing viewpoints among agencies,
lack of cooperation, and fingerpointing to evade responsibility." 0 In
short, "the more centralized the responsibility . . . the more likely the
ing to assign some senior attorneys to represent the plaintiffs in a federal class action.
I" See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972) (court can require
modification of allegations to reduce the size of the class); Aaron v. Clark, 342 F. Supp.
898, 901 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (court has power to require more precise class defini-
tion); Hardy v. United States Steel, 289 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (court
can condition denial of motion to dismiss upon an amendment of the complaint redefin-
ing the class plaintiff seeks to represent).
8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
'a Id. See Franks v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1226 (6th Cir. 1981).
88' Stare decisis and res judicata sometimes will not preclude relitigation. If the un-
derlying facts change over time, an earlier judgment will not be given a preclusive
effect. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948). In addition, if a later court
finds that plaintiffs' counsel failed to provide adequate representation in an earlier suit,
the judgment will not be considered binding. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d
67, 75-77 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally Note, Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect
of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV. 589 (1974).
"* See D. HOROWITZ, supra note 275, at 60-61. Fingerpointing may occur even
though only one agency is named as a defendant. For example, in Tatum v. Rogers,
No. 75 Civ. 2782 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1979), plaintiffs sued only the Commis-
sioner of New York's Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). DCJS is the exec-
utive agency in charge of collecting, storing, and disseminating criminal history infor-
mation in that state. Plaintiffs contended that DCJS violated their right to due process
by disseminating inaccurate and incomplete information. Although DCJS has sole re-
sponsibility by law for collecting, storing, and disseminating criminal history informa-
tion, it nonetheless sought to lay the blame for its poor performance on other agencies.
See id. at 13.
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compliance."'3 4 In addition, the indirect effects of a court order are eas-
ier to foresee when only one agency's actions are directly affected. Fi-
nally, any additional expenditures required to accomplish reform
should be relatively modest because only one agency is involved.
A suit challenging discrimination in the procedures for summoning
and qualifying petit or grand jurors is an example of a suit structured
to enjoy all of these advantages. Typically, court administrative person-
nel summon jurors and review their suitability for service. 4 2 The pro-
cess is separate from other court administrative matters, and is per-
formed by a few clerks under the direction of a jury commissioner or a
judge.A Since responsibility is centralized, court orders can easily be
given effect and compliance monitored. In addition, juror selection pro-
cedures are not complex. Therefore, a federal court can review them
with ease and order apppropriate prospective change if it discovers in-
vidious discrimination. 4
The court can structure its order to avoid disruption of state trials.
For example, if the court finds discrimination has caused under-
representation of women on the jury rolls, an interim order might di-
rect jury officials to summon a disproportionate number of women from
the rolls for actual jury service to correct the disparity. The state could
then institute a permanent change in procedures to correct the imbal-
ance in the rolls themselves after careful planniqg and training of per-
sonnel. Finally, remedying the discrimination would require almost no
additional money because the remedies would impose no substantial ad-
ditional duties on court personnel. The court would simply order jury
officials to stop discriminating, or direct that state courts replace them
841 D. HoRowrrz, supra note 275, at 61.
'~s See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 204.1, .3, .5, .7 (West 1983) (describes juror
selection procedures to be followed by court personnel); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, §§ 25,
26, & 31 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 593.37-.42 (West 1984)
(same); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 506-16 (McKinney 1983) (same).
a CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-219(a) (West 1984) (jury administrator and his
assistants appointed by the chief court administrator); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, § 24
(Smith-Hurd 1984) (in counties of more than 140,000 jury commissioners appointed by
circuit judges); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.35 (West 1984) (jury comissioner a full-time
court employee, usually the judicial district administrator); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 502(a)
(McKinney 1984) (County Clerk designates Commissioner of Jurors in counties having
a population of one million or more).
3" See, e.g., Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury
Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807, 826-30 (5th Cir. 1980) (instructing district court how it might
fashion effective changes in grand jury selection procedures in two Texas counties);
Broadway v. Culpepper, 439 F.2d 1253, 1258-60 (5th Cir. 1971) (remanding case to
district court to grant further relief as outlined by court of appeals).
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with new officials who would not discriminate.
E. Limit Litigation to a Single Stage of the Criminal Process
Although focusing litigation on a single agency is desirable, some-
times it is impossible. More than one agency may be responsible for a
constitutional deficiency; many agencies may be significantly affected by
a federal remedial order. Suits involving many components of state
criminal justice pose the greatest problems of different perspectives and
polycentricity. An effective remedy may require greater resources than
in suits against a single agency. To be manageable, suits involving
many components should be limited to reform of a single stage of the
criminal process, and preferably, of the shorter and simpler stages.
The broader the challenge, the more deep-seated and fundamental
will be the disagreements among the parties. By limiting a challenge to
specific problems at a single stage of the process, a court can limit disa-
greement. The parties are more likely to talk in common terms when
faced with a limited, specific problem. They are also more likely to
focus their attention on how to solve it, instead of digging in their heels
and refusing to address the problem seriously. Proposed solutions pose
smaller threats to everyone involved because only a small part of each
agency's overall operation is likely to be affected. The problems of
polycentricity can likewise be contained. Change will reverberate as the
agencies react and respond to the changes in each other's behavior. Be-
cause the context is so confined, however, responses are easier to predict
and accommodations easier to achieve. Finally, narrower reform should
require fewer resources than broader reform.
A suit challenging excessive delay between a suspect's arrest and
presentation to a magistrate is an example of a manageable action lim-
ited to a single and relatively short stage of the criminal process. Many
agencies are involved at this stage, including the police, defense counsel,
and the courts. In some jurisdictions, the prosecutor" 5 and a pretrial
"5 National commissions have recommended that prosecutors review arrests and
make charge decisions before a case is filed. See REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 47,
at 25; TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, supra note 46, at 5. Prosecutors follow
this procedure in New York City. See Doernberg & Zeigler, supra note 245, at 1176-
80. Police in Houston often consult the District Attorney prior to arraignment to deter-
mine the proper charges. See Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 697 (S.D.
Tex. 1982). In Jackson County, Missouri, police must obtain the prosecutor's approval
before a case can be filed with the court. J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 240 (1980). Prosecutorial involvement prior to arraignment is
by no means universal, however. See id. at 123 (describing practice in Massachusetts,
where prosecutor plays no role before arraignment). For a discussion of the various
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services agency responsible for investigating defendants' backgrounds
also play a role. 83" All of these agencies have different viewpoints. De-
fense counsel can be expected to favor speedy arraignment because it
helps the defendant. Police departments might favor prompt arraign-
ment as well because it frees police officers to return to the street and
may reduce overtime pay. Courts and prosecutors would be more am-
bivalent. Although they are not likely to oppose speedy arraignment in
principle, they might resist if required to change their procedures to
help eliminate delay.
A court order to reduce arrest to arraignment delay would affect all
of the agencies involved. Each agency would probably have to complete
its tasks more quickly. In addition, more rapid performance by one
agency might adversely affect the work of another. For example, if po-
lice brought arrestees to the courthouse more quickly, the prosecutor
might have to make a charge decision without talking to the com-
plaining witness. The pretrial services agency would have less time to
investigate each defendant's background. Lack of information could
hamper the court in setting bail or disposing of the case at arraign-
ment." 7 These sorts of direct and indirect consequences of speeding ar-
rest to arraignment processing make consideration of the federal rem-
edy complex. Because the suit is limited to one short stage of the
criminal process, however, the complexity is not overwhelming. The
federal court and the agencies involved can think the matter through,
anticipate at least most of the major consequences, and plan for them,
making some mutual accommodations along the way.848
Finally, the additional resources required from each agency to cut
delay likely would not be of a magnitude to cause resolute opposition.
practices nationally, see generally id. at 107-32; L. KATZ, L. LITWIN, & R.
BAMBERGER, supra note 46, at 104-15.
"' See generally M. FEELEY, supra note 52, at 40-79 (reviewing the development
and institutionalization of pretrial services agencies in a number of American cities).
' Limiting the time for investigation by pretrial services agencies may disadvantage
some defendants. For example, in Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025
(9th Cir. 1983), a district court order requiring arraignment within 24 hours of arrest
forced the Office of Pretrial Services to shift its emphasis from arranging for "own
recognizance" releases for defendants to ensuring police officers' affidavits were
presented to the arraignment court in timely fashion.
"8 In the few instances that federal courts have entertained challenges to prearraign-
ment delay in state criminal justice systems, the courts were able to describe and evalu-
ate the process succinctly. See, e.g., Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 697-
99 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (describing procedures for processing an arrestee in Houston);
Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1006-09 (D.D.C. 1978) (reviewing prear-
raignment processing procedures in the District of Columbia).
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If the prosecutor's office reviews a case prior to arraignment, a few
additional assistant district attorneys might be needed to complete the
task quickly. Court administrators might need to create an additional
daytime arraignment part, or open a night arraignment part. If the
court sessions were lengthened, the public defender's office would have
to assign lawyers to represent indigent defendants during the extra
hours. The pretrial services agency would probably need significant ad-
ditional staff because its primary function is to evaluate arrestees dur-
ing the arrest to arraignment period. 49 All of these changes would re-
quire only modest budget increases, with the possible exception of the
changes in pretrial services.
F. Involve All Criminal Justice Agencies That May Be Affected by
the Litigation
Much of the literature discussing class actions stresses the impor-
tance of broad participation by members of the plaintiff class to ensure
that the potentially divergent interests of absent members are ade-
quately represented.3 50 In cases seeking systemic reform of state crimi-
nal justice systems, however, plaintiff class members generally have vir-
tually identical interests in reform that enhances procedural due process
or promotes equal protection of the laws. Therefore, as long as plain-
tiffs' counsel is competent and proceeds in good faith," 1 intraclass con-
"' Pretrial services administrators probably would not oppose expansion of their
operations, although they might be concerned about short-term dislocations before the
legislature appropriated additional monies.
350 See, e.g., Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 300
(1980); Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 784, 870-901, 909-27 (1978) [hereafter Special Project, Remedial
Process]; Note, Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318,
1391-1454, 1475-1576 (1976); Comment, Judicial Screening of Class Action Commu-
nications, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 671 (1980).
"' The court can assess the adequacy of plaintiffs' counsel during the class certifica-
tion process. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Federal courts often consider
the competence of the plaintiffs' counsel in determining whether the named plaintiffs
can satisfy this requirement. See, e.g., Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 93
F.R.D. 45, 50 (D. Ore. 1981); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34, 45
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 534-41
(W.D. La. 1976); Metropolitan Area Hous. Alliance v. United States Dep't of Hous.
and Urban Dev., 69 F.R.D. 633, 640 (N.D. Ill. 1976). See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 23.07 [1.-1] at 23-215 to 23-219 (2d ed. 1982) ("Under subpart [231(a)(4),
it has become routine to inquire into the competence, experience and vigor of the repre-
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flicts of interest should be the exception. Notice to unnamed class mem-
bers or their intervention in the suit will rarely be necessary to protect
their interests.
3 52
The federal court should focus instead on involving all criminal jus-
tice agencies that may be affected by federal injunctive relief. Due pro-
cess requires that an agency or its officials be given notice and an op-
portunity to be heard before they can be subjected to a court order. 53
In addition, conflicts of interest between affected agencies will be rou-
tine, and fair resolution of the conflicts will require participation by all
whose interests are at stake. Without broad participation, effective re-
lief will be difficult to devise and implement, and unanticipated, dis-
ruptive consequences will be more likely to occur. Involving all con-
cerned, on the other hand, will increase the information available to the
court and will also increase the likelihood of cooperation by the affected
agencies in formulating remedies.'
Initially, of course, plaintiffs' counsel selects the defendants. If the
suit concerns the workings of a single criminal justice agency, designa-
tion of the agency and its top officials may suffice. If the suit concerns a
stage of the criminal process in which many agencies interact, the fed-
eral court should scrutinize plaintiffs' selection of defendants. Counsel
sentative's counsel."). See generally id. at 23-215 to 23-219; 7 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1766 (1972).
"I Most class actions seeking reform of state criminal justice systems will be brought
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), which authorizes maintenance of a class action
when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief ...with
respect to the class as a whole." Courts routinely hold that individual notice to absent
class members is not required in (b)(2) class actions if representation is adequate and
the interests of unnamed members are protected. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d
1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972); Smith v. Vowell, 379 F. Supp. 139, 145-46 (W.D. Tex.
1974); Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641, 644 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Watson v. Branch
County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 960 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Citizens Environmental
Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Kan. 1973), affd, 484 F.2d 870 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
053 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877). See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction ...
is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who
received actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.").
884 Fletcher, supra note 17, at 655-57; Special Project, Remedial Process, supra
note 350, at 909-10; Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 293, at 439-40; Note,
Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE
L.J. 1474, 1477-78 (1982).
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for the plaintiffs may have named too few defendants in order to make
the lawsuit unintrusive or to fasten responsibility for the problems on
only one or two agencies. Alternately, the plaintiffs' counsel may have
named every conceivable defendant without investigating which agen-
cies are actually responsible for the constitutional violations. The shot-
gun approach may also signal that plaintiffs' counsel has not carefully
thought out the claims or has cast the suit so broadly as to make it
unmanageable.
It often will be difficult to determine which criminal justice agencies
should be named formally as defendants and which should merely be
invited to participate informally. One test is to ask whether a grant of
complete relief would require the court to order the potential defendant
to do (or to stop doing) something if the plaintiffs succeed on the mer-
its. If the answer is "yes," plaintiffs should probably name the agency
to avoid possible claims that it was not accorded due process. 5 ' If the
answer is "no," but the potential defendant nonetheless may be indi-
rectly affected by the relief ordered, the agency should be notified of the
action and asked to participate informally.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide additional guidance.
Rule 19 allows the court to order joinder of a party if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest
Thus, the court can order formal participation by a criminal justice
agency even though it will not be subjected to a coercive order if the
indirect effects of the remedial scheme might "impair or impede" the
agency's ablility to protect its interests "as a practical matter." 5 ' A
potential defendant may also intervene in the action as of right if the
second condition of the Rule 19 quoted above is satisfied "unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."3' 58
85 See Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (ruling that all school districts that might be compelled
to accept pupil assignments by school desegregation decree should be joined as parties
and afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
Cf English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1972) (In
a class suit by black employees against employer and union, the district court appropri-
ately held that white employees whose seniority might be directly affected if plaintiffs
succeeded on the merits should have been joined under Rule 19(a)(2)(i).).
I" FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
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When no existing party represents the interests of the absent criminal
justice agency, the agency may be able to force its way into the action
even though due process does not require its presence."8 9
Once again, a suit challenging arrest-to-arraignment delay aptly il-
lustrates these principles. Depending on the jurisdiction, an order to
speed up the process might affect a large number of agencies, including
the police, the prosecutor, the public defender, the agency responsible
for providing criminal history information, the pretrial services agency,
and the court. Those most directly responsible for the delay, such as the
police and the court, should plainly be named as defendants. Whether
other agencies should formally be named would depend on the facts of
the particular case. If, to provide complete relief, the federal court
would need to order the pretrial services agency to perform its investi-
gations more quickly or order the agency responsible for providing
criminal history information to generate rap sheets more promptly,
these agencies probably should be named as defendants. On the other
hand, if the pretrial services agency would probably not be directly af-
fected by an order speeding arraignments, or the jurisdiction is one
where an up-to-date rap sheet is not needed until postarraignment
court appearances, it should be unnecessary to name these agencies as
defendants,86 0 although a court might allow them to participate infor-
mally. When the prosecutor participates in the decision to charge prior
to arraignment, 61 the court could order her joinder under Rule 19 if
speedier arraignment might as a practical matter impair her ability to
s" Rule 24 also allows the court to permit a potential defendant to intervene when
the applicant's "defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in com-
mon." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The court may deny the application, however, if the
intervention "will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the origi-
nal parties." Id. One author has suggested amending Rules 19 and 24 to facilitate
joinder and intervention in institutional reform cases. See Note, Institutional Reform
Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1484-88
(1982) (recommending that the rules require joinder of or allow intervention of right by
a "remedial party" if the person's participation in the lawsuit will provide the court
with additional information as to choice of remedy or if the court will require the
person's cooperation to implement an effective decree).
"0 See Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 472 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (In a suit seeking
to enjoin the Metropolitan Police from sending arrest records to the FBI, it was unnec-
essary to join the FBI as a party since complete relief could be achieved without the
Bureau and Bureau had no objection to the relief sought.). Cf Fair Hous. Dev. Fund
Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414, 418-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (In a suit against a town
challenging housing and land use policies, there was no need to join villages within the
town as defendants because they did not affect the town's zoning ordinances or land use
policies.).
"I See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
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perform this function. In addition, the prosecutor might seek to inter-
vene either as of right or permissively, as might any agency that be-
lieved its interests were at stake.8
6 2
G. Ensure that the Facts Are Thoroughly Developed and
Presented
Factual development and presentation is important in actions chal-
lenging state criminal justice practices and procedures because a state's
criminal procedure law and court rules will rarely provide a reliable
guide to the operation of state criminal justice. In most instances, plain-
tiffs will not challenge the facial validity of these statutes or rules; in-
stead, they will challenge the day-to-day administration of the laws.
Although the laws usually appear fair on their face, constitutional vio-
lations may exist in practice. Consequently, thorough factual develop-
ment is necessary to adjudicate the merits of a case and to devise a
workable remedial scheme.
Discovery rules are the primary tools for factual investigation in civil
litigation."" Depositions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30 and requests for production of documents and to inspect pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 are the discovery devices best suited
to factfinding in cases challenging state criminal justice practices and
procedures. In depositions, counsel can question state criminal justice
officials in detail about the performance of their duties. Although many
parts of the criminal justice system are not open to the public, Rule 34
will enable counsel to observe and study components of the system in
operation. Investigators can sit in courtrooms, clerk's offices, and police
"2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24. The court also should be alert to conflicts of interest that
may face counsel for defendants. If two or more agencies of the same level of govern-
ment are sued, the same counsel may represent them all. While this arrangement may
be satisfactory in the early stages of the lawsuit if the defendants assert common de-
fenses, problems are likely to emerge in settlement negotiations or at the remedy stage
when defendants' interests may conflict. Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note
350, at 903. For example, a conflict might arise if the same city attorney's office repre-
sented both the police and the municipal court in a suit challenging arrest-to-arraign-
ment delay. Court administrators might assert that the police are at fault for failing to
complete their paperwork promptly, while the police might contend that the cause of
the delay is insufficient arraignment parts or antiquated courthouse procedures. One
lawyer plainly would be unable to press the interests of both clients vigorously. To
lessen this problem, a court might require that a separate lawyer from each agency's
in-house legal staff be designated to represent the agency in the suit. If the agency did
not have its own legal staff, outside counsel might be assigned on a pro bono basis.
"I See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
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precincts and examine records and files to gather data.'" Some security
problems may arise when investigators come in contact with arrestees
or pretrial detainees, but courts can minimize these problems by pro-
viding guards and limiting the duration of the contacts. While criminal
justice data often are confidential, a court can usually eliminate breach
of confidentiality or invasion of privacy by deleting individual identify-
ing information during data collection."'5
Federal courts should supervise the discovery process to ensure thor-
ough factual development. Recent amendments to the Federal Rules
authorize more court involvement in the management and control of the
pretrial phases of litigation, including discovery. 66 Under Rule 26(0,
which was added in 1980, the court can convene a discovery conference
and enter an order establishing a plan and schedule for discovery. 6
Rule 16, which governs pretrial conferences, was completely revamped
in 1983868 to authorize the court to convene a pretrial conference for a
number of beneficial purposes, including "improving the quality of the
trial through more thorough preparation . . . .",' Rule 16(c)(10)
states that conference participants "may consider and take action with
respect to . . . the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex is-
sues."3 0 These new rules plainly give federal courts the tools to ensure
thorough factual development; the courts should use them.
s" FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) reads:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and
permit the party making the request . . . to inspect and copy, any desig-
nated documents . . . or (2) to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the request
is served for the purpose of inspection ....
aOB See, e.g., Doernberg & Zeigler, supra note 245, at 1155-64 (presenting the re-
sults of an audit of New York's computerized criminal history information system
without identifying persons whose rap sheets were studied).
366 Traditionally, the parties controlled discovery. The court intervened only when a
party sought a protective order under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) or moved to compel discov-
ery under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
367 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The primary purpose of Rule 26(f) is to curb discovery
abuse. See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(0, 85 F.R.D. 526 (1980). But the
Rule is also intended to smooth the discovery process and to ensure the cooperation of
all parties in conducting discovery. As the Advisory Committee Note states, "this subdi-
vision provides that counsel who has attempted without success to effect with opposing
counsel a reasonable program or plan for discovery is entitled to the assistance of the
court." Id. at 527.
s" See FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
369 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(4).
371 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(10).
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Other rules give the courts additional means of ensuring that the
facts are fully explored and presented. The court may appoint a master
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and direct the master
"to receive and report evidence" to the court on particular issues.8 7 ' A
master may require production of documents and put witnesses under
oath and examine them.1 2 Federal Rule of Evidence 614 empowers a
federal court to call and examine witnesses on its own motion, and
Rule 706 permits the court to appoint its own expert witnesses.13 Fi-
nally, a court may solicit amicus briefs from agencies or officials that
are not formal parties to the litigation but have an interest in the
suit.
37 4
H. Proceed Incrementally in Devising and Implementing Relief
Much has been written about the difficulties in the relief stages of
institutional reform litigation. 375 Unfortunately, the remedial phase of
criminal justice reform cases will probably not proceed any more easily
or smoothly than in other kinds of cases seeking systemic reform. State
criminal justice officials will often resent federal court interference.
They will probably obfuscate and delay to the best of their ability. 76
Federal court reform of state criminal justice systems will undoubtedly
be slow and difficult.
8 77
In other contexts the federal courts have proceeded incrementally
when faced with state officials' intransigence. The courts slowly in-
crease their control over remedy formulation and implementation to en-
force their orders. 73 Although sometimes painstakingly slow, this "sce-
071 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c).
8 Id. See generally Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Spe-
cial Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 753 (1984).
070 See FED. R. EviD. 614(a)-(b), 706(a).
074 See generally Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
070 See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, supra note 275; Kirp & Babcock,Judge and Company:
Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA.
L. REy. 313 (1981); Special Project, Remedial Process, supra note 350, at 790-842,
853-70; Note, Implementation Problems, supra note 293;
370 See supra note 278 and accompanying text; Special Project, Remedial Process,
supra note 350, at 795-96 (exploring reasons why government bureaucrats resist court
orders).
077 See supra notes 277-88 and accompanying text.
370 Well-known examples of cases following this approach are Rhem v. Malcolm,
which concerned conditions of confinement in Manhattan's Tombs jail, Morgan v.
Kerrigan, the Boston school desegregation case, and Wyatt v. Stickney, which concerned
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nario of escalating intrusiveness' '"T has worked tolerably well in other
institutional reform cases 80 and should be followed in criminal justice
cases.
After declaring the rights and obligations of the parties, the court
should order the parties to negotiate among themselves (in consultation
with other interested groups) and agree upon an affirmative plan 81 to
remedy the constitutional violation. 82 If agreement is impossible the
court might hold hearings on proposed remedial schemes or appoint a
master or oversight committee to devise a detailed plan according to
general guidelines laid down by the court.3 83 If the defendants ignore
the court's order or otherwise proceed in bad faith, the court might
treatment of persons in Alabama mental institutions. The tortured histories of Rhem
and Morgan and complete citations to the many opinions of the district and circuit
courts in both cases are set forth in Note, Developments in the Law - Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1231-39 (1977). Accounts of the Wyatt
litigation can be found in Drake, Judicial Implementation and Wyatt v. Stickney, 32
ALA. L. REv. 299 (1981), and Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial
Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975) [hereafter Note, The
Wyatt Case].
3'9 A. GOLDSTEIN, Supra note 66, at 64.
"0 Commentators have supported this approach. See, e.g., id. at 64-71; Special Pro-
ject, Remedial Process, supra note 350, at 837-42; Note, The Wyatt Case, supra note
378, at 1247-50.
88 Some writers have asserted that a negative injunction, which orders a defendant
to stop doing something, is preferable to an affirmative injunction, which directs a de-
fendant to do particular things, because a negative injunction is less intrusive. See, e.g.,
0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7-10 (1978); Fletcher, supra note 17, at
649-50. This theory is sometimes, but not always, valid. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct.
1970 (1984), presents a good example of an unintrusive negative injunction. In
Pulliam, the district court enjoined a Virginia magistrate's practice of setting bail in
nonjailable cases and incarcerating defendants who could not make the bail. Id. at
1972-73. The impact on the magistrate's behavior was minimal, because she had no
affirmative ongoing duties to perform under the order. The indirect effects on the crim-
inal justice system also were negligible. Consider, by contrast, an order that attorneys
working for a public defender not carry a caseload in excess of 30 cases in a jurisdiction
in which the average caseload had been approximately 100 cases. Although negatively
formulated, such an injunction would certainly slow the criminal process.
88 See Fletcher, supra note 17, at 652-53. Directing the defendants to take the initi-
ative in proposing a plan may be beneficial. The defendants presumably have substan-
tial expertise in conducting their affairs, and thus can use their institutional wisdom to
solve the problems. Coffin, supra note 198, at 994. In addition, if the defendants can be
encouraged to participate, they may be more willing to implement changes than if rem-
edies are imposed wholly from without. Note, The Wyatt Case, supra note 378, at
1248.
'' Chayes, supra note 275, at 1299-1301; Note, Implementation Problems, supra
note 293, at 460-61; Note, The Wyatt Case, supra note 378, at 1249.
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make its instructions more specific or impose time limits for compli-
ance. If these measures fail, and pleading, exhorting, and threatening
are all to no avail, then the court ultimately must consider contempt
procedures, replacing uncooperative officials, or placing an agency in
receivership.38'
Although reform will be difficult, there are reasons for hope. The
federal courts' substantial expertise in court administration and crimi-
nal justice reform will aid them in assessing proffered plans and evalu-
ating a defendant's compliance or excuses for noncompliance. In addi-
tion, when federal courts need advice or assistance concerning a state
criminal justice agency, they can turn to other federal officials for help.
For example, FBI officials might assist a court in devising a plan for a
local police department to investigate civilian complaints about police
misconduct. 85 Similarly, federal court clerks in charge of juror selec-
tion and qualification could aid in reforming state jury selection proce-
dures. If a federal court appointed a master to reform state probation or
prosecutorial practices, the federal probation department or the United
States Attorney's Office could provide knowledgeable and experienced
personnel. Finally, the federal courts can ask for assistance from the
lawyers who practice in the state criminal justice system and from the
bar generally. Bar associations certainly would agree to appoint com-
mittees to study problems and to recommend changes to remedy consti-
tutional violations. 8 ' Thus, the federal courts are themselves competent
and equipped with all the potential assistance they might need.
3 A federal court obviously should be reluctant to impose such measures and
should do so only when no other course is available. Courts have taken these steps in
other contexts. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 534 (1st. Cir. 1976)
(head of school and other personnel transferred); Aspira of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of
Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647, 653-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding defendants in contempt);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 226 (D. Mass. 1975) (three members of school
committee held in civil contempt); Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 716 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), affd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (psycho-
logical testing used to screen prison guards for racist or sadistic tendencies); Turner v.
Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 730 (S.D. Ga. 1966) (school system placed in receivership).
"' Cf Burger, Crime and Punishment, 5 Am. J. TRIAL ADV. 95, 99 (1981) (sug-
gesting that the FBI Academy provides a pattern for training state and local police).
3" The New York City Bar Association, for example, has committees that issue
regular reports on the City's criminal justice system. See, e.g., The Committee on
Criminal Advocacy, The Individual Calendar System - A Needed Reform for the
New York City Criminal Court, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 301 (1982); The Committee
on Criminal Advocacy, Prosecutorial Displacement of Judicial Sentencing Power
under People v. Farrar: A Call for Reconsideration and Remedial Action, 39 REc.
A.B. CITY N.Y. 141 (1984); The Committee on Criminal Law, Report on the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 598 (1982).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the Younger abstention doctrine from a
modern perspective and has argued that the doctrine should be aban-
doned. Abstention in criminal justice cases is wholly inconsistent with
federal court activism in desegregation, reapportionment and prisoners'
right suits. It cannot be justified by special principles of comity between
state and federal judges. Direct federal injunctive relief is necessary to
reform state criminal justice systems. Litigants and courts should follow
the suggested guidelines in structuring and adjudicating criminal justice
reform cases.

